The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results

By R. Duch, Randolph Stevenson. 2008

866 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ee2fdb51561d95128578eaa03cdf7f8aa3c9a8cc

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Citations in the corpus

Democracy in crisis? The declining support for national democracy in European countries, 2007-2011 (2014, background): “The causal mechanisms are complicated and highly conditional on institutions (Duch & Stevenson 2008).”
Global Competition and Brexit (2018, unknown): “This is in linewith results in the economic vote literature (Duch and Stevenson 2008; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981).”
Crisis signaling: how Italy's coronavirus lockdown affected incumbent support in other European countries (2020, unknown): “Whatever the precise mechanisms, our findings inform the literature on performance voting (e.g., Kramer, 1971; Fiorina, 1981), competence misattribution (e.g., Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Healy et al., 2010).”
Lobbying as a collective enterprise: winners and losers of policy formulation in the European Union (2013, methodology): “As voters cannot directly observe the behaviour of their agents, they condition their vote choice on the overall macroeconomic performance (Duch and Stevenson 2005: 389).”
Clarity of responsibility: How government cohesion conditions performance voting (2013, methodology): “Duch and Stevenson (2005, 2008) have also argued that economic voting is weaker when power is dispersed, but in contrast to most of the economic voting literature, they build on a selection model rather than the traditional sanctioning model.”
Substituting the End for the Whole: Why Voters Respond Primarily to the Election‐Year Economy (2014, background): “In addition, a growing political science literature has considered how other heuristics affect voters (e.g., Kuklinski and Quirk 2000; Berry and Howell 2007; Oliver and Ha 2007; Duch and Stevenson 2008; Duch and Tyran 2012).”
Economics and Elections Revisited (2013, methodology): “Innovative as these studies were, they “provide only very crude evidence of whether economic voting exists, or does not, in particular survey contexts” (Duch & Stevenson, 2008, p. 23).”
Does Extreme Political Ideology Predict Conspiracy Beliefs, Economic Evaluations and Political Trust? Evidence From Sweden (2017, unknown): “Most of them examine and test the basic assumptions of the theory that macroeconomic conditions predict electoral preferences (e.g. Downs, 1957; Duch & Stevenson, 2008; Fiorina, 1981; Kinder & Kiewiet, 1979; Lewis-Beck, 1988).”
Learning About Voter Rationality (2018, unknown): “But there is a second, indirect effect: A change in disaster intensity also changes the Voter’s reelection threshold.”
The VP-function revisited: a survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after over 40 years (2013, background): “Fair (1978) identifies the change in the unemployment rate and GNP growth as having meaningful effects on US presidential vote shares.”
Economic expectations and support for secession in Catalonia: between causality and rationalization (2014, background): “This is an issue that parallels the problem identified in the economic voting literature: several scholars have pointed out that economic perceptions are largely endogenous to party preference, and some even argue that this effect dominates the traditional economic voting argument (Duch et al., 2000”