Democracy, visibility and public good provision

213 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Is Democracy Good for the Poor (2006, unknown): “A model developed by Mani and Mukand (2002) suggests that as governments move from authoritarian to partially democratic, they will tend to favor high-visibility public projects over essential public goods.”
Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor: Understanding Political Incentives for Providing Public Services (2005, background): “Mani and Mukand (2002) show that if elections are intended to enable voters to select the most competent candidates, then resource allocation will be biased against public goods whose outcomes are more noisy and harder to use to assess politician ability, and politicians will have an incentive to pr”
Democracy, Credibility and Clientelism (2005, unknown): “However, Mani and Mukand (2002) demonstrate that if elections are intended to enable voters to select the most competent candidates, then resource allocation will be biased towards those public goods that allow voters to better assess politician ability — those for which outcomes are less subject…”
The Politics of Public Services: A Service Characteristics Approach (2015, background): “Particularly in democracies, low visibility public goods such as health, sanitation or education are likely to get less voter and political attention than famine relief or defense during war (Mani & Mukand, 2007).”