The 'shared manifold' hypothesis: From mirror neurons to empathy.

By Vittorio Gallese †. 2001

1,033 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ed75bf178d25c72375a0ef636f8afeb1e3040566

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Citations in the corpus

Forms of Relational Meaning: Issues in the Relations Between the Implicit and Reflective-Verbal Domains (2008, background): “These “as if” mechanisms have been described by Damasio (1999) and Gallese (2001).”
Emotional Empathy as Related to Mimicry Reactions at Different Levels of Information Processing (2003, background): “The biologically prepared tendency towards neural mirroring of the movements of others has been proposed to explain children’s development of an understanding of the internal state of others ( Gallese, 2001; Williams et al., 2001; Wolf et al., 2001).”
Corporealized and Disembodied Minds: A Phenomenological View of the Body in Melancholia and Schizophrenia (2005, background): “Moreover, it is not just the movements, but precisely the intentional, goal-directed actions of others by which the mirror matching system is activated, for example, reaching for a cup or biting an apple (Gallese 2001).”
Playing together without communicating? A pre-reflective and enactive account of joint musical performance (2015, background): “The processes of mutual causation stemming from this coupling (Noë, 2004) is grounded in the concrete, active ways in which we interact with and make sense of the world in which we are embedded before and below any kind of explicit cognitive subordination (Gallese, 2001, 2005).”
Attention and reality constraints on the neural processes of empathy for pain (2007, background): “According to the proposal that empathy is mediated by an unconscious and automatic simulation of others’ emotional state (Gallese, 2001; Gallese and Goldman, 1998), one would expect that stimulus displays showing hands in a painful situation generate similar neural responses in the ACC and insula ir”
Phenomenology and Psychopathology (2010, background): “This bodily resonance is supposedly mediated by the mirror neuron system in the premotor cortex (Gallese 2001).”
Inference or interaction: social cognition without precursors (2008, background): “Such activations constitute ‘simulation routines, as if processes enabling models of others to be created’ at the functional level (Gallese 2001 , 45; also see Gallese 2007 ).”
The Feeling Body: Toward an Enactive Approach to Emotion (2007, background): “…activated as if the individual seeing the movement were actually performing the movement. e existence of mirror neurons suggests that perception and action share a common neural substrate , and that this shared substrate evolved as a means to make sense of the actions of others (Gallese, 2001).”
Simulationist models of face-based emotion recognition. (2005, background): “, & Gallese, V. (2001). Neurophysiological mechanisms underlying the understanding”
Emotion Experience and its Varieties (2009, background): “Emotion imagery thus contains states of action readiness (Frijda & Sundararajan, 2007; Jeannerod, 1997), as does empathy (Gallese, 2001).”
The Affordances for Social Psychology of the Ecological Approach to Social Knowing (2007, background): “Recent neuroscience studies also attest to such sensitivity (Gallese, 2001).”
Making enactivism even more embodied (2014, background): “For example, some simulation theorists, like Gallese (2001; Gallese and Sinigaglia 2012) understand empathic consciousness or social cognition to be embodied in at least a weak sense.”
Mentalizing in the Development and Treatment of Attachment Trauma (2013, background): “Of particular concern here, mirror neurons also link observing emotion to feeling emotion (Gallese, 2001).”