Experiencing Oneself vs Another Person as Being the Cause of an Action: The Neural Correlates of the Experience of Agency

By C. Farrer, ChrisD . Frith. NeuroImage, 2002

956 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Social Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ece2c0faac4fadb136d6b56aeb2f52ecbb67cd5a

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Citations in the corpus

What imitation tells us about social cognition: a rapprochement between developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience. (2003, background): “…by converging evidence from neuropsychology (Kinsbourne 2002), and other neuroimaging studies (e.g. Ruby & Decety 2001; Chaminade & Decety 2002; Farrer & Frith 2002; Farrer et al. 2003), as well as from abnormalities in self–other distinctions found in schizophrenic patients (e.g. Spence et…”
The neural bases of cooperation and competition: an fMRI investigation (2004, background): “Recent evidence from neuroimaging studies point out that this region is an important neural component for the sense of agency, and its activation is related to the attribution of actions to the self (e.g., see Farrer and Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 2003).”
Human Empathy Through the Lens of Social Neuroscience (2006, methodology): “In another study[59], a joystick was used to drive a circle along a T-shaped path.”
Development of the adolescent brain: implications for executive function and social cognition. (2006, background): “Several neuroimaging studies have implicated the inferior parietal cortex in the distinction between the self and others at the sensorimotor level (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1998; Farrer & Frith, 2002; Ruby & Decety, 2001).”
The Role of the Right Temporoparietal Junction in Social Interaction: How Low-Level Computational Processes Contribute to Meta-Cognition (2007, background): “…feeling of being the cause of one’s own actions, desires, or thoughts, which relies on the comparison between selfgenerated and externally produced sensory signals, have consistently resulted in activation of the right TPJ (e.g., Ruby and Decety 2001; Farrer and Frith 2002; Farrer and others 2003).”
Somatosensory activations during the observation of touch and a case of vision-touch synaesthesia. (2005, background): “Farrer and Frith (2002) found activation of a very similiar region of the anterior insula cortex, in both hemispheres, when subjects attribute actions to themselves rather than to another person.”
The precuneus: a review of its functional anatomy and behavioural correlates. (2006, background): “Likewise, in two fMRI studies, differential increases of neural activity were found bilaterally in the precuneus and frontal cortex during third-person relative to first-person perspective (Farrer and Frith, 2002; Vogeley et al., 2004).”
The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency vs. Joint-Agency (2012, background): “parietal cortex and the insula are strongly implicated in this process of self–other distinction (Ruby & Decety, 2001; Farrer & Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 2003; Jeannerod & Pacherie, 2004).”
A Bayesian account of ‘hysteria’ (2012, result): “…this finding goes against numerous studies that demonstrate increased activity around this area in conditions when movements feel involuntary, in both normal subjects (Farrer and Frith, 2002; Blakemore and Sirigu, 2003) and people with schizophrenia (Spence et al., 1997; Schnell et al., 2008).”
Are there theory of mind regions in the brain? A review of the neuroimaging literature (2009, background): “Other studies have implicated the TPJ and additional parietal regions in the attribution of agency to others [e.g. Farrer et al., 2003; Farrer and Frith, 2002], arguably a key process in mental state reasoning [Baron-Cohen, 1995].”