Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey.
By E. Madden, R. Luce, H. Raiffa. 1958
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
- Shimon Whiteson
- P. V. van Lange
- Sergey Levine
- Pieter Abbeel
- Jakob N. Foerster
- Igor Mordatch
- Daniel Balliet
- J. Urgen Schmidhuber
Citations in the corpus
- Learning with Opponent-Learning Awareness (2017, background): “1) consists of two classic infinitely iterated games, the iterated prisoners dilemma (IPD), [28] and iterated matching pennies (IMP) [23].”
- Nonnegative Decomposition of Multivariate Information (2010, background): “In contrast, many of the most interesting and challenging scientific questions, such as many-body problems in physics [2], n -person games in game theory [3], and population coding in neuroscience [4, 5], involve understanding the structure of interactions between three or more variables.”
- Rationality in Economics (2001, unknown): “Yet it is not without its conceptual difficulties, as Luce and Raiffa (1957) in particular pointed out rather early on.”
- Behaviour in commons dilemmas: Homo economicus and Homo psychologicus in an ecological-economic model (2000, background): “Luce and Raiffa’s Games and Decisions (Luce and Raiffa, 1957) awakened a fascination for the conflict between individual and collective interests in many social scientists also outside the economic tradition.”
- A Note on the Utility Function Under Prospect Theory (2008, unknown): “Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1130800”
- Advancing Multilevel Research Design (2013, background): “A common example is the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game (Axelrod, 1980a, 1980b; Luce & Raiffa, 1957), where two players generate four possible payoffs that are rank ordered DC > CC > DD > CD for the first player (i.e., first letter in the two-letter decision outcome).”
- Risk and rationality in entrepreneurial processes (2007, background): “For example, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and Luce and Raiffa (1957) extended decision making based on expected utility to game theoretic problems.”