Managing Chinese Bureaucrats: An Institutional Economics Perspective

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Performance Management, High-Powered Incentives, and Environmental Policies in China (2015, background): “In the context of governmental actors, China has maintained centralized political control of policy implementation, primarily achieved through its monopolistic personnel management mechanism, the nomenklatura (Bo 2002; Huang 2002; Landry 2008; Li and Zhou 2005; Sheng 2007).”
Making Bureaucracy Work: Patronage Networks, Performance Incentives, and Economic Development in China (2018, background): “In this article, I focus on the more “bureaucratic” face of these officials, investigating their roles as agents in a regional bureaucracy and their interactions with their provincial superiors (for studies adopting similar terminology, see Huang 2002; Landry, Lü, and Duan 2017).”
Term limits and rotation of Chinese governors: do they matter to economic growth? (2008, background): “As Huang (2002) correctly elaborates, the control mechanism in China's political system consists of both explicit and implicit instruments.”
Retire in Peace: Officials’ Political Incentives and Corporate Diversification in China* (2018, background): “and a cadre responsibility system evaluates them based on the extent to which they achieve the state’s goals (Walder, 1995; Huang, 2002).”