Term limits and rotation of Chinese governors: do they matter to economic growth?
117 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ddc8db677de8ff71b3bc85362b90a165a19875d5
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Citations in the corpus
- Do land revenue windfalls create a political resource curse? Evidence from China ☆ (2016, background): “…is less likely to occur at the county level may be attributed to the existence of a “rotation” system at the provincial level to groom political leaders before appointing them to still higher positions in the central government or party (Zhang and Gao, 2008), and the lack of one below the province.”
- Institutional open access at home and outward internationalization (2015, unknown): “…regions or other positions based on performance evaluation, in which regional economic growth rate is a key measure (Shi et al., 2014a; Wu et al., 2013).3 Therefore, 3 Although five years are one term, the CPC uses rotation as “a strategic instrument to control governors” (Zhang & Gao, 2008: 276).”