Private Investment and Political Institutions

By D. Stasavage. 2002

200 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ec0722cc4764182001c4cb602377cc01619d4b5e

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Citations in the corpus

The Quality of Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment (2007, background): “This result is consistent with those of Stasavage (2002), who finds that formal institutions that produce policies that are more predictable and stable have a positive and significant impact on domestic investment.”
Democracy under the Gun Understanding Postconflict Economic Recovery (2009, background): “Because many investments are irreversible, firms might choose not to invest for fear of expropriation or future policy changes that imperil their investments (Aizenman 1997, 1998, 2003; Aizenman and Marion 1999; Dixit and Pindyck 1993; Grabel 2000; Stasavage 2002).”
Democracy, Autocracy, and Expropriation of Foreign Direct Investment (2009, background): “Fourth, in the literature on how politics influence investment behaviors, some scholars (e.g., Frye, 2004; Henisz, 2000b; Stasavage, 2002b) suggest that greater political constraints generally encourage private investment.”
The effect of institutional factors on public–private partnership success in ports (2015, background): “In addition, raising the institutional quality would also have a positive effect on domestic investment as Mauro (1995) and Stasavage (2002) have shown.”
Policy credibility and delegation to independent regulatory agencies: a comparative empirical analysis (2002, background): “This step remains faithful to the literature (Stasavage 2002) as well as to the overall argument of the hypothesis, namely that delegation may help governments to mitigate time-inconsistency problems when dealing with investors.”
The Worldwide Diffusion of Market-Oriented Infrastructure Reform, 1977–1999 (2005, background): “Empirical studies emphasizing policy emulation among peer countries include Collier and Messick’s (1975) research on the adoption of social security systems; Kobrin’s (1985) study of oil nationalizations; Guler et al.’s (2002) study of the adoption of quality certification; Brune and Guisinger’s…”
The Rule of Law and Economic Growth: Where are We? (2011, background): “In an important critique of North and Weingast (1989), Stasavage (2002, 2003) argues similarly that British Parliament acted as a check on the king not because of institutional arrangements but because it directly represented bondholders.”
The Rule of Law and Economic Development (2008, background): “In an important critique of North & Weingast (1989), Stasavage (2002, 2003) argues that it is not the institutional checks that matter for executive restraint—even in the canonical English case—but the extent to which the executive’s own support base would be harmed by an adverse shift in policy.”
The impact of institutional quality on foreign direct investment inflows: evidence for developed and developing countries (2018, result): “The results for the developed countries are in accordance with the empirical growth literature, which stresses the importance of institutions for economic growth (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001; Hall & Jones, 1999; Mauro, 1995; Stasavage, 2002).”