A requires/provides model for computer attacks
By S. Templeton, K. Levitt. New Security Paradigms Workshop, 2001
437 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Computer Networks and Communications, Information Systems, Signal Processing
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ebbd0e972566aef48f67221036f3f187d3d58a33
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Computer Networks and Communications
- Wenke Lee
- Christopher Krügel
- Giovanni Vigna
- Guofei Gu
- Fredrik Valeur
- Shanika A. Karunasekera
- Chenfeng Vincent Zhou
- Vinod Yegneswaran
In Information Systems
- Christopher Krügel
- Giovanni Vigna
- Guofei Gu
- Brian O'Berry
- Paul Ammann
- Chenfeng Vincent Zhou
- Steven Noel
- C. Leckie
In Signal Processing
- Wenke Lee
- Christopher Krügel
- Giovanni Vigna
- Guofei Gu
- Fredrik Valeur
- Martin W. Fong
- Phillip A. Porras
- Vinod Yegneswaran
Citations in the corpus
- BotHunter: Detecting Malware Infection Through IDS-Driven Dialog Correlation (2007, background): “A more applicable area of alert correlation research is multistage attack recognition, in which predefined scenario templates capture multiple state transition sequences that may be initiated by multiple threat agents [40] [29].”
- Scalable, graph-based network vulnerability analysis (2002, background): “Templeton and Levitt [16] develop a ‘requires/provides’ model for modeling chains of network attacks and reducing the complexity of such a model.”
- A survey of coordinated attacks and collaborative intrusion detection (2010, background): “JIGSAW (Templeton and Levitt, 2000) is another attack specification language that is designed for identifying the casual relationship between individual alerts using pre and post-conditions.”
- Comprehensive approach to intrusion detection alert correlation (2004, methodology): “Another example that uses pre and postconditions to identify causal relationships between alerts is JIGSAW [45].”
- Efficient minimum-cost network hardening via exploit dependency graphs (2003, background): “Also, there has been work that emphasizes the modeling rather than the analysis of attacks [16][17].”