Excessive Volatility in Capital Flows: A Pigouvian Taxation Approach
By Olivier Jeanne, Anton Korinek. 2010
401 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/eb628faeef58704f0efddbd74249cd8688aec36b
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Anton Korinek
- F. Collard
- Harris Dellas
- B. Diba
- Michel Juillard
- Enrique G. Mendoza
- Joseph E. Stiglitz
- Javier Bianchi
In Finance
- Anton Korinek
- F. Collard
- Harris Dellas
- B. Diba
- Enrique G. Mendoza
- Joseph E. Stiglitz
- Javier Bianchi
- Olivier Jeanne
Citations in the corpus
- Rounding the Corners of the Policy Trilemma: Sources of Monetary Policy Autonomy (2015, neutral): “…a view that targeted capital controls, used in a flexible manner, could serve a prudential role and reduce financial fragility (Jeane (2011, 2012), Jeanne and Korinek (2010), Korinek (2011), Bianchi (2011)) or, for pegged countries could substitute for monetary policy autonomy and provide a…”
- The financial resource curse (2013, neutral): “3See Benigno et al. (2012), Bianchi (2011), Bianchi and Mendoza (2010), Jeanne and Korinek (2010) and Korinek (2010).”
- Dealing with the Trilemma: Optimal Capital Controls with Fixed Exchange Rates (2012, neutral): “A related strand of work emphasizes pecuniary externalities that work through prices in borrowing constraints, for example Bianchi and Mendoza (2010), Bianchi (2011), Jeanne and Korinek (2010), Korinek (2011).”
- Macroprudential Policy - A Literature Review (2012, neutral): “In related work, Jeanne and Korinek (2010) show how the interaction between debt accumulation and asset prices amplifies credit booms and busts.”
- Where Modern Macroeconomics Went Wrong (2017, neutral): “Unless one has succeeded in eliminating the prospect of future crises, the 33 See Korinek (2010, 2011a,b, 2012), Jeanne and Korinek (2010), and Dávila and Korinek (2017).”
- Macroprudential Regulation versus mopping up after the crash (2020, neutral): “See for example Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003), Lorenzoni (2008), Jeanne and Korinek (2010, 2019), Stein (2012), He and Kondor (2016), D´avila and Korinek (2018) and Korinek (2018) for papers that motivate macroprudential intervention on the basis of pecuniary…”
- Capital Flows and Foreign Exchange Intervention (2019, neutral): “See for example Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004), Mendoza (2010), Bianchi (2009), Bianchi and Mendoza (2010), Jeanne and Korinek (2010) and Korinek (2011).”
- What do we know about the effects of macroprudential policy (2018, neutral): “Jeanne and Korinek (2010) for example show that a Pigouvian tax on borrowing may induce borrowers to internalize these externalities and increase welfare.”
- A Theory of Capital Controls as Dynamic Terms-of-Trade Manipulation (2014, neutral): “…among other things, how restrictions on international capital flows may be welfare enhancing in the presence of various credit market imperfections ðsee, e.g., Calvo andMendoza 2000; Caballero and Lorenzoni 2007; Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki 2010; Jeanne and Korinek 2010; Martin and Taddei 2010Þ.”
- Regulating Capital Flows to Emerging Markets: An Externality View (2018, positive): “We implement our numerical simulations using an endogenous gridpoints method for occasionally binding collateral constraints, as described in Jeanne and Korinek (2010b), extended to the case of state-contingent financial markets.”
- The New Economics of Prudential Capital Controls: A Research Agenda (2011, background): “First, they may be caused by changes in the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of domestic agents—if they are constrained today, they value future payoffs comparatively less and asset prices declines (see, for example, Jeanne and Korinek, 2010a, b).”
- Optimal Monetary and Prudential Policies (2017, background): “where the equality comes from (12) and (3), the first inequality from (17), the second inequality from (8), and the third inequality from the fact that R t > R S t in equilibrium.”