Multilevel Governance and Business Interests in the European Union

By R. Eising. 2004

215 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Political Science and International Relations, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ea952411e163a068984d9a7a3d62be493af1931f

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Political Science and International Relations

In Strategy and Management

Citations in the corpus

Critical resource dependencies and the Europeanization of domestic interest groups (2007, background): “Schmidt refers to the fact that national polities act as a potential learning school for the development of skills that are particularly important at the EU level and explains differences by considering variance in this regard (1999: 164–5; see also Coen 1998: 93; Eising 2004: 231).”
Ties that count: explaining interest group access to policymakers (2013, background): “…to provide interest group access (Poppelaars 2009b; Braun 2012) and earlier research on how different types of expertise 116 B E Y E R S A N D B R A U N are needed in order to obtain access to different EU officials (Beyers 2002; Bouwen 2002; Eising 2004, 2007; Beyers and Kerremans 2012).”
Lobbying in the European Union: From sui generis to a comparative perspective (2006, background): “Studying the behaviour of groups reveals the importance of supranational or national centres of decision-making, which in turn helps to determine if EU governance should be described as neo-functionalist, intergovernmentalist or multi-level decision-making (Eising 2004 ).”
Empirical and theoretical studies in EU lobbying (2007, background): “…while a few of these projects attempted to construct large N studies of interest action in the EU (Coen 1997, 1998; Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999; Eising 2004; Beyers 2002, 2004), the majority have focused on smaller case studies of specific policy domains (Bouwen 2002, 2004a; Maloney et al.…”
The access of business interests to EU institutions: towards élite pluralism? (2007, background): “In particular, the exclusion of those organizations that do not maintain contacts exaggerates the mean access of national associations because only a minority of the national groups represent their interests regularly at the EU level (Eising 2004).”
Lobbying versus litigation: political and legal strategies of interest representation in the European Union (2007, unknown): “A number of systematic studies of EU interest politics have investigated the direct access of interest groups to the three main EU institutions, i.e. the Commission, the Parliament and the Council (Pappi and Henning 1999; Beyers 2002; Bouwen 2004a; Eising 2004).”