The Theory of Incentives I: The Principal-Agent Model

By Luciano Messori. 2013

1,177 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e91cbeaf92a89ccf25ebf27ff00262f35f042026

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Citations in the corpus

Why real leisure really matters: incentive effects on real effort in the laboratory (2014, unknown): “As a result, the field of experimental labor economics (Charness and Kuhn 2011) has emerged to test many of the predictions that have been generated by incentive and contract theories (Laffont and Martimort, 2002; Bolton and Dewatripont 2005).”
Contract Theory in Continuous-Time Models (2012, background): “Since that time, the topic has been of interest mostly in the area of microeconomics, economic theory, and mathematical economics with a plethora of work therein, most of which either covers the principal-agent problem from the economic theory of contracts point of view (see, for instance, [4, 6]) o”
Global sourcing and quality recalls: An empirical study of outsourcing-supplier concentration-product recalls linkages (2014, background): “By using archival data in this analysis, the information gathered is not dependent on survey respondents’ perceptions and or attitudes (Goffin et al. 2006).”
Split Incentives in Residential Energy Consumption (2012, background): “There is a long history of economic theory developed to explain a variety of situations where two parties have differing incentives, usually occurring in settings where there is asymmetric information between a principal and an agent either before or after the contracting phase (e.g., Arrow (1963), ”
Beyond Convexity: Stochastic Quasi-Convex Optimization (2015, background): “Quasi-convex optimization problems arise in numerous fields, spanning economics [20, 12], industrial organization [21] , and computer vision [8].”
Introduction to Multi-Armed Bandits (2019, background): “(2007b), and Langford and Zhang (2007) for ad placement, Li et al. (2010) and Li et al. (2011) for news optimization, and Radlinski et al.”
Supply Chain Sourcing Under Asymmetric Information (2011, unknown): “The theorem follows directly from properties of adverse selection in principal agent theory and the tradeoff between rent extraction and efficiency (see, e.g., Laffont and Mortimer 2001, Salanie 2005).”
The Disparate Effects of Strategic Manipulation (2018, background): “Instead, as is common in information economics and especially signaling theory, “cost” reects the multiplicity of factors that bear on the eort exertion required by feature manipulation [4, 21, 25, 26].”
Information Technology and Business-Level Strategy: Toward an Integrated Theoretical Perspective (2013, background): “…Masten 1988, 1996; Joskow 1985; Klein et al. 2005) and an even richer theoretical tradition models agency-cost theories (Holmstrom and Tirole 1989; Laffont and Martimort 2002), the empirical testing of agency cost theories has been challenged with the problem of operationalizing measures for the…”