Legal Reform and Loan Repayment: The Microeconomic Impact of Debt Recovery Tribunals in India

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Access to Collateral and Corporate Debt Structure: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2012, unknown): “1 See La Porta et al. (1997), Levine (1998, 1999), Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007), Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine (2004), Haselmann, Pistor, and Vig (2010), and Visaria (2009).”
Do Debt Contract Enforcement Costs Affect Financing and Asset Structure (2014, unknown): “As documented in Visaria (2009), the introduction of DRTs significantly decreased the processing time of a debt recovery case.”
Misallocation in the Market for Inputs: Enforcement and the Organization of Production* (2018, unknown): “Moreover, courts matter for economic outcomes beyond their role in mitigating holdups with suppliers, notably by improving contracting between managers and workers (Besley and Burgess, 2004, and Bloom, Sadun and Reenen, 2012), and improving access to financing (Visaria, 2009).”
Credit Market Consequences of Improved Personal Identification: Field Experimental Evidence from Malawi (2012, background): “Visaria (2009) documents the positive impact of expedited legal proceedings on loan repayment among large Indian firms, even among loans that originated before the reform, consistent with a reduction in moral hazard.”
Does Court Speed Shape Economic Activity? Evidence from a Court Reform in India (2012, background): “This article differs from Visaria(2009) in two ways.”