Does Court Speed Shape Economic Activity? Evidence from a Court Reform in India
By Matthieu Chemin. 2012
195 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/78d0cf9244d71c8f30f651aad5af548eaa2826b0
Citations in the corpus
- Misallocation in the Market for Inputs: Enforcement and the Organization of Production* (2018, unknown): “Ponticelli and Alencar (2016) and Chemin (2012) argue that better courts reduce financial frictions.”
- How Collateral Laws Shape Lending and Sectoral Activity (2016, unknown): “For example, Jappelli, Pagano, and Bianco (2005), Chemin (2010), and Ponticelli (2013) show that the way rights are enforced, or not, by courts can be as important as the existence of rights as a matter of law.”
- Enlarging the Contracting Space: Collateral Menus, Access to Credit, and Economic Activity (2016, unknown): “On that front, evidence shows that court inefficiency has hampered the success of reforms meant to ease credit access (Chemin, 2010; and Ponticelli, 2013).”
- Court Enforcement and Firm Productivity: Evidence from a Bankruptcy Reform in Brazil (2013, unknown): “Other papers using within-country variation in judicial variables are Chemin (2012), which studies the impact of judicial reform on the lending and investment behavior of small firms in India; Jappelli et al. (2005), which exploits variation across Italian judicial districts to establish a relation ”