A visible hand? Bond markets, political parties, balanced budget laws, and state government debt

By R. Lowry. 2001

127 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Disentangling Accountability and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits (2011, background): “8 A higher yield spread increases the cost of borrowing and can reﬂect rising debt, poor economic performance, mismanagement, corruption, and other factors that bear on the state’s ability to make its debt service payments (Lowry and Alt 2001).”
Regulatory Capture: A Review (2006, unknown): “Lowry and Alt (2001) offer a model and evidence that more-restrictive fiscal institutions may enhance transparency by allowing investors to extract better signals regarding the government’s fiscal responsibility.”
Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia in EMU (2008, unknown): “Lowry and Alt (2001) specify a similar regression equation and show that fiscal institutions in American states have real effects on bond rates.”
Fiscal Rules and the Sovereign Default Premium (2022, unknown): “(4) Since equation (4) is different from (3), the allocation that maximizes the government’s period”
Sovereign Bond Market Reactions to Fiscal Rules and No-Bailout Clauses - The Swiss Experience (2013, unknown): “Lowry and Alt (2001) show that investors are more forgiving of one-time deficits in states with strict fiscal rules (i.”