So What Do I Get? The Bank's View of Lending Relationships
By Sreedhar T. Bharath, Sandeep Dahiya, Anthony Saunders, Anand Srinivasan. 2007
637 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e818204276144c143f0c01ee3e8473d7808e27b6
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Michael Schwert
- Allen N. Berger
- Miguel A. Ferreira
- Pedro Matos
- Raluca A. Roman
- Steven R. G. Ongena
- Anthony Saunders
- Geraldo Cerqueiro
In Economics and Econometrics
- Michael Schwert
- Allen N. Berger
- Miguel A. Ferreira
- Raluca A. Roman
- Steven R. G. Ongena
- Pedro Matos
- Peter F. Chen
- Zhiming Ma
In Finance
- Michael Schwert
- Allen N. Berger
- Miguel A. Ferreira
- Steven R. G. Ongena
- Raluca A. Roman
- Pedro Matos
- Anthony Saunders
- Geraldo Cerqueiro
Citations in the corpus
- Firm exit after distress: differentiating between bankruptcy, voluntary liquidation and M&A (2011, positive): “…able to make an accurate assessment of a large firm’s financial health, as a result of the larger information content and higher quality of financial statements (Bharath et al. 2007; Zeghal 1984) and the fact that there is more voluntary disclosed information or alternative sources of information.”
- On Loan Sales, Loan Contracting, and Lending Relationships (2009, background): “…an original lead lender, an indicator for loans where an original lead lender is ranked in the top-10, and industry fixed effects.26 Previous evidence suggests that prior lending relationships and lender reputation are positively related to keeping the lead lender (see e.g. Bharath et al. 2005).”
- Credit Supply and Corporate Innovation (2013, background): “7 As shown by Bharath et al. (2007), public firms have a strong propensity to borrow from local lenders, so we assume that firms should be primarily affected by the banking deregulations in the state of their headquarters.”
- The role of information asymmetry and financial reporting quality in debt trading: Evidence from the secondary loan market $ (2008, neutral): “Bharath et al. (2004) also suggest that small borrowers have greater information asymmetries, and a loan’s size is typically”
- The Information Role of Audit Opinions in Debt Contracting (2016, positive): “Bharath et al. (2008) provide evidence that the quality of a borrower’s”
- The Rise of Shadow Banking: Evidence from Capital Regulation (2018, neutral): “If relationship banks cross-sell other products, then they might prefer to retain ownership irrespective of capital levels (Bharath et al. 2007).”
- Corporate Leverage, Debt Maturity and Credit Supply: The Role of Credit Default Swaps (2013, background): “Bharath et al. (2007) report that firms are more likely to choose lenders that are headquartered in the same state, suggesting that states are relevant for defining local credit supply.”
- The Response of Corporate Financing and Investment to Changes in the Supply of Credit (2010, neutral): “, Diamond (1984), (1991), Fama (1985)).”