Managerial Ownership, Information Content of Earnings, and Discretionary Accruals in a Non-US Setting

By G. Gabrielsen, J. Gramlich, Thomas Plenborg. 2002

191 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e80bad26a0a63d9272ef533c3cd1c7bde83da864

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Citations in the corpus

Does Corporate Governance Influence Earnings Management in Latin American Markets? (2014, background): “Large shareholders play a key role in internal control of companies, because the volume of participation encourages them to monitor and influence the strategy of the firm in which they have invested (Fernandez 1998; Yeo et al. 2002; Gabrielsen et al. 2002).”
How do the ownership structure and board of directors' features impact earnings management? The Spanish case (2020, background): “…or in seasoned equity offerings (Cohen & Zarowin, 2010); in the choice of reserves or provisions for loan losses, which are always subjective (Tirole, 2006); or in the accruals (Dechow, 1994; Gabrielsen et al., 2002; García-Teruel, Martínez-Solano, & Sánchez-Ballesta, 2009), among many others.”
Mekanisme Corporate Governance, kualitas laba dan nilai perusahaan (2006, background): “Gabrielsen et al (2002) menguji hubungan antara kepemilikan manajerial dan kandungan informasi laba serta discretionary accrual.”
Investigating the Relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility and Earnings Management: Evidence from Spain (2016, methodology): “Following previous studies Warfield et al., 1995; Gabrielsen et al., 2002) we employ he absolute value of discretionary accruals [Abs(DACC)] as ur measure of earnings management.”
The Influence of Family Ownership on the Quality of Accounting Information (2010, background): “For this reason, in line with Healy and Palepu (2001), we expect a positive association between MTB and AQ.”
Corporate Governance Quality and Earnings Management: Evidence from Jordan (2016, methodology): “We use the absolute value because either positive or negative discretionary accruals are considered as earnings management behavior (Wartfield et al., 1995; Gabrielsen et al., 2002; Wang, 2006; Chen et al., 2007; Barth et al. 2008).”
Corporate Governance and Earnings Management: A Meta‐Analysis (2009, background): “…insider ownership on discretionary accruals use as estimates of discretionary accruals: (1) the difference between accruals and accruals expected based on the average of the previous four years (Gabrielsen et al., 2002); and (2) the Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986) models (Warfield et al., 1995).”
The Effect of the Board Composition and its Monitoring Committees on Earnings Management: evidence from Spain (2007, unknown): “Firm ownership structure is also likely to be linked to earnings manipulation practices (Warfield et al., 1995; Gabrielsen et al., 2002), and firm ownership structure and board of directors characteristics are strongly correlated to some firm features (Denis and Sarin, 1999).”