Do Analysts Matter Most When Investors are Protected Least

By Mark H. Lang, K. Lins, David Eccles, Darius P. Miller, Yiorgos Allayannis, Amy Dittmar, Will Goetzmann, Rebecca Hahn, Ole‐Kristian Hope, Mike Lemmon and 5 more. 2003

132 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e7c8b13dd966a412ae8d1bf8d36633b363572c95

Citations in the corpus

• Do Implicit Barriers Matter for Globalization (2013, unknown): “We proxy transaction costs by the zero-return measure that is used for Emerging Markets in Lesmond (2005) and Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2007).”
• Does International Cross-Listing Improve the Information Environment? (2008, unknown): “Cross-listed firms are less aggressive in terms of earnings management than non-cross-listed firms, even though they are more aggressive than comparable U.S. firms (Lang, Raedy, and Wilson, 2006).”
• Societal trust and corporate tax avoidance (2018, unknown): “For example, Lang et al. (2004) find that analysts are particularly important for firms with controlling families/managers in environments in which legal institutions provide poor protection for minority shareholders.”
• Do Analysts Understand the Economic and Reporting Complexities of Derivatives (2016, unknown): “15   commissions (Hayes 1998; Lang et al. 2004).”
• Auditor Choice in Politically Connected Firms (2014, unknown): “, Lang and Maffett, 2011; Lang et al., 2012). This includes analyzing in Model 2 the number of analysts following a firm (ANALYSTS). Lang et al. (2012) hold that greater analyst coverage and forecast accuracy are likely to reflect greater transparency in the firm’s information environment.”
• The Effect of Annual Report Readability on Analyst Following and the Properties of Their Earnings Forecasts (2011, unknown): “9   finds that firms attempt to obfuscate bad news by increasing the complexity of their communication, and Lang, Lins, and Miller (2004) find that analysts are less likely to cover firms with incentives to withhold or manipulate information.”
• Information Asymmetry, the Cost of Debt, and Credit Events: Evidence from Quasi-Random Analyst Disappearances (2016, unknown): “For prominent examples of the impact of analysts on stock prices, see Womack (1996) and Lang, Lins, and Miller (2004); for liquidity, see Irvine (2001); for capital structure, see Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary (2006); for corporate financing activities, see Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (2000); and for…”
• The governance role of multiple large shareholders: evidence from the valuation of cash holdings (2011, unknown): “To avoid multicollinearity complications due to high correlations between XCASH, the MLS proxies, and their interactions, we follow prior studies (e.g., Lang et al. 2004; Lemmon and Lins 2003; Pinkowitz et al.”
• Large controlling shareholders and stock price synchronicity (2014, unknown): “…structure turns out to explain earnings management (Warfield et al., 1995), earnings informativeness (Fan and Wong, 2002), analyst following (Lang et al., 2004; Boubaker and Labégorre, 2008), accounting conservatism (Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008), and the cost of corporate borrowing…”