Debt Maturity and the Effects of Growth Opportunities and Liquidity Risk on Leverage

By Shane A. Johnson. 2003

590 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e65ba84cc03955fb14458a24092740c8d2bb325a

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Debt Maturity (2015, methodology): “…of debt maturing in more than three years is 49%, with 66% of total debt maturing in more than one year, and33% of total debt maturing in more than five years These results are consistent with previous literature which has similar figures (Johnson, 2003; Chen et al., 2012; Custódio et al., 2013).”
Financial Flexibility, Investment Ability, and Firm Value: Evidence from Firms with Spare Debt Capacity (2010, background): “This combination of lower leverage and higher short-term debt may reflect the attempt by FF firms to minimize underinvestment problems (Johnson, 2003; Datta, Datta, and Raman, 2005; Marchica, 2007).”
Leverage and investment under a state-owned bank lending environment : evidence from China (2008, methodology): “Asset Maturity is therefore used as an instrumental variable by Johnson (2003) and Billett et al. (2007) in their system of leverage, growth and maturity equations.”
Growth Opportunities and the Choice of Leverage, Debt Maturity, and Covenants (2007, methodology): “Although the greater liquidity risk of short-term debt can have a negative direct effect on leverage, Johnson (2003) and Childs, Mauer and Ott (2005) argue that at the margin, the use of short-term debt should attenuate the negative effect of growth opportunities on leverage.”
A Theory of Debt Maturity: The Long and Short of Debt Overhang (2012, unknown): “2 The interpretation of endogenous default given debt burden as “underinvestment” due to debt-overhang, is mentioned in, for example, Lambrecht and Myers (2008) and He (2010). 3 To name a few recent studies on debt overhang, see Philippon and Schnabl (2009) and Diamond and Rajan (2010) 4”
Dividend policy, creditor rights, and the agency costs of debt. (2009, background): “Second, since firms with long-term debt ratings are likely to have higher credit quality (Johnson, 2003) we proxy for credit risk using the presence of long-term debt ratings.”
Does the Source of Capital Affect Capital Structure (2003, background): “…the correct price and the price of 8 The literature which has examined firm’s choice of maturity (Guedes and Opler, 1996, Barclay and Smith, 1995a, Johnson, 2003, Stohs and Mauer, 1996), priority (Dennis, Nandy, and Sharpe, 2000, Barclay and Smith, 1995b) or choice of lender (Cantillo and…”
The Determinants of Corporate Debt Maturity Structure (2012, background): “For example, underinvestment occurs when the debt maturity is not appropriately timed and debt refinancing occurs after investment options expire so the gains from new investments accrue to the debt holder (Johnson, 2003).”
Optimal Priority Structure, Capital Structure, and Investment (2012, background): “, Rajan and Zingales 1995; Johnson 2003) find a negative relation. 18 See Chen and Zhao (2006) for a statement of this thesis and for additional citations to the voluminous capital structure literature that makes this assertion.”
Ownership structure, control contestability, and corporate debt maturity (2015, methodology): “Second, previous studies argue that firms likely choose the level of their leverage and the maturity of their debt simultaneously, which implies that the use of OLS regressions could be problematic (e.g., Barclay et al., 2003; Johnson, 2003).”