Optimal Priority Structure, Capital Structure, and Investment

By Dirk Hackbarth, David C. Mauer. 2012

269 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d868c5ca366ba1d5eeef739b52227eab2318922e

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Finance

In Strategy and Management

Citations in the corpus

Squaring venture capital valuations with reality (2020, unknown): “These complicated seniority structures are consistent with work by Hackbarth and Mauer (2011) who show this is an optimal choice for high-risk firms.”
A Theory of Debt Maturity: The Long and Short of Debt Overhang (2012, unknown): “For dilution issues, see Diamond (1993), Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2011), and Hackbarth and Mauer (2011), and related discussion in Section 4.6.2. t=2 t=1 t=0 State B 1/6 1/6 1/3 1/3 1/2 1/2 24 12 0 State G 1/2 1/2 Figure 1: Time line for numerical examples, with conditional probabilities denoted on…”
Corporate Governance and the Dynamics of Capital Structure: New Evidence (2014, unknown): “…as underinvestment (e.g., Ju and Ou-Yang, 2006; Titman and Tsyplakov, 2007; Sundaresan and Wang, 2007; Hackbarth, 2008; Pawlina, 2010; Dang, 2011; Hackbarth and Mauer, 2012) and asset substitution (e.g., Leland, 1998; Ju and Ou-Yang, 2006; Sundaresan and Wang, 2007; Dangl and Zechner, 2007), on…”
Firm Cash Holdings and CEO Inside Debt (2013, background): “We find that our evidence is more consistent with CEO risk aversion than a spending hypothesis originally put forth by Harford et al. (2008) to explain their finding that cash balances are smaller in firms with weaker corporate governance structures. In particular, we find that inside debt and its c”
Corporate Investment and Financing Under Asymmetric Information (2011, unknown): “…the magnitude of investment and financing distortions due to conflicts of interest between inside equityholders and outside investors (see Mello and Parsons, 1992; Morellec, 2001; Hennessy and Whited, 2007; Sundaresan and Wang, 2007; Hackbarth and Mauer, 2010; and Morellec and Schürhoff, 2010).”
The Mystery of Zero-Leverage Firms (2013, unknown): “The exceptions are models with endogenous investment (Hennessy and Whited, 2005; Hackbarth and Mauer, 2012) and models that introduce fixed costs in the dynamic capital structure model with sufficiently small firms optimally choosing zero leverage (Kurshev and Strebulaev, 2012).”
Dynamic Investment, Capital Structure, and Debt Overhang (2015, unknown): “15 See Section 5 and also Hackbarth and Mauer (2012) for analysis where more than one class of debt are outstanding.”
The Influence of Governance on Investment: Evidence from a Hazard Model (2011, background): “Hackbarth and Mauer (2010) show that capital structure and debt maturity structure influence firm investment behavior.”