Contributions to the Theory of Games

By J. Bilbao, Jacqueline Morgan, H. Peters. 2005

489 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e574de225f5733d63721f336b8efbf952db4c36d

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In Management Science and Operations Research

Citations in the corpus

Calibrated Incentive Contracts (2013, methodology): “These goals can be achieved by following the regret-minimization approach of Blackwell (1956) and Hannan (1957).15 Define RT ≡ (R1,T , αR2,T ) and ρT ≡ RT − RT−1 the vector of flow regrets.16 In order to keep regrets R1,T and R2,T small, it is sufficient to keep vector RT small.”
Axiomatic attribution for multilinear functions (2011, background): “Recall that the Shapley value (Shapley [23]) is a solution concept in cooperative game theory used to distribute the total surplus generated by a coalition of players among the players.”
Dynamic Programming for Partially Observable Stochastic Games (2004, methodology): “A finite-horizon POSG can be viewed as a type of extensive game with imperfect information [16].”
Algorithmic Transparency via Quantitative Input Influence: Theory and Experiments with Learning Systems (2016, background): “A thorough exploration of other points in this design space remains an important direction for future work.”
Using counterfactual regret minimization to create competitive multiplayer poker agents (2010, background): “Kuhn invented a simple one-round one-card poker game in 1950 so that the hand-computed optimal solution could be studied [11].”
Approximating game-theoretic optimal strategies for full-scale poker (2003, background): “Due to the computational limitations involved, only simplified poker variations have been solved in the past (e.g. [Kuhn, 1950; Sakaguchi and Sakai, 19921).”