Relative Performance Evaluation and the Turnover of Provincial Leaders in China

By Y. Chen, Hongbin Li, Li-an Zhou. 2005

589 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Abstract Using data from China, this paper examines the role of relative performance evaluation in the turnover decisions made by the central government. We find that the turnover of provincial leaders hinges on provincial economic performance relative to their immediate predecessors.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e44805cb9309a995bc26980afca9628ecc507543

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Citations in the corpus

Do land revenue windfalls create a political resource curse? Evidence from China ☆ (2016, background): “Empirical evidence has indeed shown a strong association between GDP growth and promotion (Chen et al., 2005; Edin, 2003; Jia et al., 2014; Landry, 2008; Li and Zhou, 2005; Persson and Zhuravskaya, 2015; Yao and Zhang, 2015; Whiting, 2000).”
Strategic interaction in political competition: Evidence from spatial effects across Chinese cities (2016, background): “Chen et al. (2005) further show that such political turnover also depends on the officials’ performance relative to their immediate predecessors.”
Incentivizing China's Urban Mayors to Mitigate Pollution Externalities: The Role of the Central Government and Public Environmentalism (2014, background): “The central government had been focusing on economic growthwith an emphasis on GDP as the key evaluation criterion for local officials' performance (Chen et al., 2005; Li and 3 See: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-28/china-s-power-demand-growthmay-slow-to-9-this-year-nea-says.html. rs…”
Developing by borrowing? Inter-jurisdictional competition, land finance and local debt accumulation in China (2017, background): “…system’ and local officials’ political promotion (Shih et al., 2012), other scholars have provided empirical evidence on the relationship between the turnover of local officials and their economic performance (Chen et al., 2005; Feng et al., 2012, Guo, 2009; Li and Zhou, 2005; Lu and Landry, 2014).”
The Political Economy of Development in China and Vietnam (2014, background): “A number of studies have demonstrated associations between economic performance and promotion (Yang 2004, Chen et al. 2005, Landry 2008).”
Performance Management, High-Powered Incentives, and Environmental Policies in China (2015, background): “…of provincial officials held accountable by a centralized personnel system that rewards economic growth with both monetary rewards and promotion (Chen, Li, and Zhou 2005; Li and Zhou 2005), environmental protection, especially in the context of inter- and intra-provincial socioeconomic…”