Universally Composable Commitments
By Ran Canetti, Marc Fischlin. Annual International Cryptology Conference, 2001
649 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e22aba3465642e2c1d2ac0c043b9a28bdf9e5e04
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Dan Boneh
- Elaine Shi
- Brent Waters
- Florian Tramèr
- Yehuda Lindell
- Iddo Bentov
- Jonathan Katz
- Amit Sahai
In Computer Networks and Communications
- Elaine Shi
- Yehuda Lindell
- Rafael Pass
- Benny Pinkas
- Florian Tramèr
- Iddo Bentov
- Jean-Pierre Hubaux
- Ranjit Kumaresan
In Sociology and Political Science
- Jean-Pierre Hubaux
- Rosario Gennaro
- Yehuda Lindell
- Benny Pinkas
- Rafael Pass
- Aggelos Kiayias
- Amit Sahai
- Rafail M. Ostrovsky
Citations in the corpus
- Ouroboros Genesis: Composable Proof-of-Stake Blockchains with Dynamic Availability (2018, methodology): “Our analysis is in the (partial) synchronous model of universally composable (UC) functionalities [9, 11, 22] that was also used in [4] to analyze the bitcoin protocol.”
- Sealed-Glass Proofs: Using Transparent Enclaves to Prove and Sell Knowledge (2017, result): “Interestingly, our results show that FTEE adds to a known list of setups, including Common Reference Strings [36] or Tamper Proof Hardware Tokens [37], from which any multi-party functionality can be securely realized [35], [36].”
- Universally Composable Security with Global Setup (2007, methodology): “We conjecture that GUC authentication protocols (namely, protocols that GUC-realize ideally authentic communication channels) that use a global PKI setup can be constructed by combining the techniques of [26, 15].”
- Formal Abstractions for Attested Execution Secure Processors (2017, background): “As Canetti and Fischlin show [19], a common reference string allows us to circumvent this impossibility by giving the simulator more power.”
- How to Use Bitcoin to Design Fair Protocols (2014, background): “Perhaps, the main drawback in considering UC security is the fact that to UC realize most (standard) functionalities one typically needs to assume the existence of a trusted setup [28, 29, 47].”
- Universally composable security: a new paradigm for cryptographic protocols (2001, background): “This result is shown in [CF01] for the cases of commitment and coin-tossing.”
- Secure Multiparty Computation from SGX (2017, result): “In a seminal paper, Katz [28] shows how to bootstrap (universally composable) MPC in a setting where users have access to tamper-proof tokens on which they can load arbitrary code.”
- BiTR: Built-in Tamper Resilience (2011, background): “For example, if the result of [28] was achievable with arbitrarily-tamperable hardware token, that would give general UC-secure protocols in the “plain” model, which is known to be impossible [13].”
- Universally composable two-party and multi-party secure computation (2002, methodology): “The simulator for F 1:M zk thus runs the simulator for the protocol of [ cf01 ] for this proof.”
- Secure Two-Party Computation via Cut-and-Choose Oblivious Transfer (2011, methodology): “Our transformation uses universally composable commitment schemes [5] which can be constructed efficiently.”
- Multi-trapdoor Commitments and Their Applications to Proofs of Knowledge Secure Under Concurrent Man-in-the-Middle Attacks (2004, methodology): “In the common reference string model (which is necessary as proven in [11]), a UCZK protocols for Hamiltonian Cycle was presented in [12].”