Doing vs. Allowing Harm
By Fiona Woollard, Frances Howard-Snyder. 2002
97 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e214499bf4ba8c5840de26f081b49159b47d727c
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
- Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
- J. V. Horn
- Vincent C. Müller
- Jana Schaich Borg
- Scott T. Grafton
- Catherine Hynes
- Joshua D. Greene
- Jana Samland
Citations in the corpus
- Ethics of artificial intelligence and robotics (2020, background): “In the classic ‘trolley problems’ (J. J. Thompson 1976; Woollard and Howard-Snyder 2016, section 2) various dilemmas are presented, the simplest version is that of a trolley train on a track that is heading towards five people and will kill them, unless the train is diverted onto a side track, but…”
- Consequences, Action, and Intention as Factors in Moral Judgments: An fMRI Investigation (2006, background): “…Allowing (DDA) says that it takes more to justify doing harm than to justify allowing harm; thus, for example, it is sometimes morally wrong to commit an act of killing in circumstances where it would not be morally wrong to let someone die by refraining from an act of saving (Howard-Snyder, 2002).”