Divide et Impera: Optimal Leniency Programmes

By Giancarlo Spagnolo. 2004

165 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e1d487d0cc16d919bd1ff9f406d83943dca8717d

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Citations in the corpus

fines, leniency, and rewards in antitrust (2009, unknown): “…Motta and Polo (2003) and surveyed in Rey (2003) and Spagnolo (2008), has shown that granting LENIENCY to subjects reporting before the opening of an investigation can be very effective in deterring cartels but may also be used strategically by wrongdoers to punish defections (Spagnolo 2000, 2004).”
Leniency policies and illegal transactions (2006, background): “…criminal relationships sustained by repeated interaction leniency for self-reporting wrongdoers can have a particularly strong deterrence effect: Spagnolo (2000, 2004) showed that leniency for undetected wrongdoers that spontaneously self-report could in principle costlessly deter all forms of…”
Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement (2009, background): “In an appendix, I examine a deterministic game-theoretical model, akin to that of Spagnolo (2004), and show that the main predictions of the theoretical model are robust to industry-level heterogeneity.”
Leniency and Whistleblowers in Antitrust (2006, background): “This model therefore produces equilibrium reports from cartels already under an investigation, as in Motta and Polo (2003), but has no implications regarding equilibrium reports before detection, the focus of Spagnolo (2000a, 2004), Ellis and Wilson (2001), and Aubert et al. (2004).”
On the Design of Leniency Programs (2013, unknown): “3 See Spagnolo (2004) for an excellent survey of this literature. trigger alternative forms of collusion in industries that would or could not collude otherwise.”
Do leniency policies facilitate collusion? Experimental evidence (2015, background): “Spagnolo (2004) and Aubert et al. (2006) have shown that a reward system where whistleblowers obtain a bonus payment for reporting the cartel is superior to a leniency policy which reduces the ne. Empirical contributions by Miller (2009) and Brenner (2009) evaluate the e ciency of the US and EU…”