Voluntary disclosures around share repurchases

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The Association Between Management Earnings Forecast Errors and Accruals (2009, background): “…prior to share repurchases or stock option grants to boost potential gains from repurchased stocks or awarded stock options (Gong et al. 2008; Baker et al. 2003), and these firms may also provide pessimistic earnings forecasts prior to these events (Brockman et al. 2008; Aboody and Kasznik 2000).”
Managerial Incentives and Management Forecast Precision (2013, background): “Brockman et al. (2008) find that the frequency and magnitude of bad news (good news) disclosures are higher (lower) before share repurchases, presumably to deflate stock prices so that firms can buy back shares at a lower price.”
Strategic News Releases in Equity Vesting Months (2018, background): “Starting with the former, several papers examine the relation between disclosure and equity incentives (Penman (1982), Noe (1999), Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003), Cheng and Lo (2006), and Brockman, Khurana, and Martin (2008)).”