The market for 'lemons': quality uncertainty and the market mechanism

By Joseph E. Stiglitz. 2002

690 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: General Agricultural and Biological Sciences

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e0233107b4664504a0ed4dca81824925821a1186

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In General Agricultural and Biological Sciences

Citations in the corpus

Economics and Electronic Commerce: Survey and Directions for Research (2001, background): “” The idea of a market for lemons comes from Akerlof, who posits that buyer uncertainty about trade-item quality will lead to market failure [5].”
High Consumption Volatility: The Impact of Natural Disasters? (2003, background): “9 The GMM estimator is based on first differencing, and controls for the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable and the potential endogeneity of the other explanatory variables (see Arellano, 1993; Arellano and Bond, 1998).”
Evaluating borrower’s default risk in peer-to-peer lending: evidence from a lending platform in China (2017, background): “Such asymmetric information may lead to some problems, such as moral hazard and adverse selection (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Akerlof 1970).”
Long‐term Care: A Suitable Case for Social Insurance (2010, background): “Adverse selection arises where the buyer can conceal from the insurer the fact that he is a bad risk, and is thus an insurance-market manifestation of ‘lemons’ (Akerlof 1970).”
Critical Push: Strategies for Creating Momentum in the Motion Picture Industry (2000, background): “In actual markets, however, buyers often have less information at their disposal than sellers are willing or able to provide (Akerlof, 1970; Shapiro, 1982; Stiglitz, 1989).”
Agroindustrialization of the global agrifood economy: bridging development economics and agribusiness research. (2000, background): “2 A complementary perspective evolves from the theory of imperfect information having roots in the work of Akerlof (1980). 3 The economics of rural organization analyzes market and non-market institutional arrangements within the rural sector of developing countries (Stiglitz, 1988; Bardhan, 1989b; ”
How Do Firing Costs Affect Worker Flows in a World with Adverse Selection? (2004, background): “and substituting this equation into (4) determines mc (η) uniquely.”
Discourses of transparency in the intellectual capital reporting debate: Moving from generic reporting models to management defined information (2009, background): “From the point of view of agency theory (cf. Akerlof 1970), a dilemma exists between minimizing information asymmetry and the costs of disclosure (cf. Verrechia 1983), both from a cost/benefit perspective, but more importantly also with regard to the sensitivity of the information disclosed…”
Boom and Bust in the Venture Capital Industry and the Impact on Innovation (2002, background): “For instance, Myers and Majluf (1984) demonstrate that equity offerings of firms may be associated with a “lemons” problem (first identified by Akerlof 1970).”
Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling (2001, background): “For related papers applying this principle, see Gunther Franke (1987), Thomas Noe (1989), M. P. Narayaman (1988), George Constantinedes and Bruce Grundy (1990), and Gautam Goswami, Noe, and Michael Rebello (1995).”