Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited

By Françoise Forges. 2006

86 citations recorded by the source corpus.

A mistake in “Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium (CE) in games with incomplete information” motivates a re-examination of some extensions of the solution concept that Aumann introduced.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/dfa1805b087926a77431fccec36af864d4ebe354

Citations in the corpus

• Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information (2011, unknown): “Forges (1993) is titled and identi es ve legitimate de nitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information and Forges (2006) describes a mistake in Forges (1993) that leads to a sixth de nition.”