The Market for Corporate Control

By C. Weir. 2013

1,248 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/df8237b37ac23637affb98236062a89818d7decc

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In Strategy and Management

Citations in the corpus

CEO Overconfidence and International Merger and Acquisition Activity (2013, background): “1Among the many empirical studies that examine mergers are Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983), Jensen and Ruback (1983), Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991), Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992), Loughran and Vijh (1997), Rau and Vermaelen (1998), Bruner (2002),…”
Voluntary corporate governance structure and financial distress: Evidence from Australia (2015, background): “Jensen and Ruback (1983) further suggested that directors should hold substantial equity interests in their firms, which gives them an incentive to act in the best interests of shareholders.”
Synergy Sources, Target Autonomy, and Integration in Acquisitions (2013, background): “…(M&As); similarity; complementarity; autonomy; integration Acquisitions remain common despite widely reported evidence that the majority are unsuccessful (e.g., Datta, Narayanan, & Pinches, 1992; Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009; Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Sirower, 1997).”
Principal‐principal conflicts under weak institutions: A study of corporate takeovers in China (2013, background): “Second, in the western context, corporate control is defined as the right to determine the management of corporate resources, such as the right to hire, fire, and set the compensation of top managers (Jensen and Ruback, 1983).”
Do Analysts Matter for Governance? Evidence from Natural Experiments (2015, background): “7 Mergers and acquisitions are one of the largest investments for a firm, and the availability of the terms and characteristics of takeover transactions enable us to pin down the agency problems more easily (Jensen and Ruback, 1983).”
Corporate Governance: What’s Special About Banks? (2013, background): “In a typical hostile takeover, successful bidders acquire control over poorly performing firms through tender offers, typically ousting management in the process (Jensen & Ruback 1983).”
From social control to financial economics: the linked ecologies of economics and business in twentieth century America (2009, background): “Financial economists saw the large diversified conglomerates that dominated the American economic landscape as examples of managerial behavior that decreased the market value of firms and were therefore harmful to shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen and Ruback 1983).”
Andrew Carnegie and the foundations of contemporary entrepreneurial philanthropy (2011, background): “Acquiring a nexus of property rights sufficient to become a dominant actor within an economic field is not a passive process, but invariably requires victory in a succession of contests for control (Bourdieu, 1996; Jensen & Ruback, 1983; O’Sullivan, 2000).”