A New Capital Regulation for Large Financial Institutions

By Oliver Hart, Luigi Zingales. 2011

262 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/df3b736e50044fc4b85bccd777c09508e2960e6c

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Citations in the corpus

A Safer World Financial System: Improving the Resolution of Systemic Institutions (2010, background): “Some proposals for contingent capital (e.g., D’Souza et al., 2009; Hart and Zingales, 2010) assume that book values of the institution’s equity relative to its assets, based on accounting reports and/or examinations by supervisors, would be used as a conversion trigger for contingent capital.”
Contingent Convertible Bonds and Capital Structure Decisions (2010, background): “Also, based on equation (12), the higher is cc the lower is c̄b.”
Microprudential Regulation in a Dynamic Model of Banking (2014, background): “…of the PCA over non–contingent regulatory prescriptions supports the desirability of recent proposals to introduce contingencies in the regulation of capital structure, such as those advanced in the pioneering work by Flannery (2005), Flannery (2009), and more recently by Hart and Zingales (2011).”
A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation (2011, background): “who winds up ultimately holding the exposure—be it a bank, broker-dealer, hedge fund, or special purpose vehicle. This task is not easy, but one tool that would help is broad-based regulation of haircuts on asset-backed securities.(10) Consider the case where the exposure is a consumer loan. If this”
Government Intervention and Information Aggregation by Prices: Government Intervention and Information Aggregation by Prices (2015, unknown): “For example, Hart and Zingales (2009) propose a mechanism, by which the government will perform a stress test on banks whose market price deteriorates below a certain level, in order to evaluate whether there is a need for intervention.”
Caught between Scylla and Charybdis? Regulating Bank Leverage When There is Rent-Seeking and Risk-Shifting (2015, unknown): “Equally likely are externalities from a fullscale run on the financial sector when many banks fail at the same time. induced by regulatory forbearance would be even larger.”
Toward a Run-Free Financial System (2014, background): “Admati and Hellwig (2012) (see also my review, Cochrane (2013a)) have pretty definitively skewered this view and lucidly address much of the basic confusion on the issue of bank equity.”
How Does Capital Affect Bank Performance During Financial Crises (2013, unknown): “A.N. Berger, C.H.S. Bouwman / Journal of Financial Economics 109 (2013) 146–176 147 Acharya, Mehran, and Thakor, 2011; Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig, and Pfleiderer, 2011; Calomiris and Herring, 2011; Hart and Zingales, 2011).”
The Real Effects of Financial Markets (2012, unknown): “First, we argue that a new definition of price efficiency is needed to account for the extent to which prices reflect information useful for the efficiency of real decisions (rather than the extent to which they forecast future cash flows).”
Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Expensive (2013, unknown): “…the recent financial crisis.86 If done under the force of regulation, withholding dividends would not lead to any negative inference on the health of any particular bank.87 85 Hart and Zingales (2010) propose that regulators use market information to determine when to force banks to recapitalize.”