Public expenditure, corruption, and economic growth: the case of Italy

By Alfredo Del Monte, Erasmo Papagni. 2001

356 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/dea8337427559d4e71e1e5e618f01de17d45660b

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

In Sociology and Political Science

Citations in the corpus

Law Enforcement, Municipal Budgets and Spillover Effects: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Italy (2017, background): “Political corruption negatively affects economic growth and fosters excessive and inefficient public spending (Mauro, 1995, 1998; Del Monte and Papagni, 2001; Arin et al., 2011; Hessami, 2014).”
Taxation, corruption, and growth (2016, unknown): “Prior work also describes how corruption can weaken the public goods necessary for growth (e.g., Del Monte and Papagni 2001, 2007; Paserman et al. 2008, Fiorino et al. 2012), with Italian regional variation being frequently exploited.”
Corruption, Institutions, and Economic Development (2009, background): “This include data on the number of o¢ cials convicted for corruption (see e.g., Alt and Lassen (2003) for a study of US states and Del Monte and Papagni (2001) for a study of Italian regions) and data on the amount of leakage from infrastructure projects in Italian regions (Golden and Picci, 2005).”
Corruption, growth, and governance: Private vs. state-owned firms in Vietnam (2012, unknown): “Papagni (2007), and Rand and Tarp (2010) on the causes and determinants of corruption and Del Monte and Papagni (2001), Glaeser and Saks (2006), and Fisman and Svensson (2007) on the consequences of corruption.”
Organized crime, the quality of local institutions and FDI in Italy: A panel data analysis (2011, background): “…a social and institutional context characterised by other forms of illegality that include corruption and, evenmore widespread, the violation of regulations that are non-penal but important for the correct functioning of the economy (Del Monte and Papagni, 2001, 2007; La Spina and Lo Forte, 2006).”
Governance regimes, corruption and growth: theory and evidence (2008, background): “Yet another reason is corruption-induced under-investment in public capital (Del Monte and Papagni, 2001).”
Corruption, Growth, and Income Distribution: Are there Regional Differences? (2006, methodology): “Several authors have argued that increased government consumption decreases economic growth (Barro 1991; Mankiw et al. 1992; Del Monte and Papagni 2001; Ehrlich and Lui 1999; Gray and Kaufmann 1998; Mauro 1995).”
The determinants of corruption in Italy: Regional panel data analysis (2007, unknown): “Corruption inhibits economic growth (Mauro, 1995, 1998; Bliss and Di Tella, 1997; Mo, 2001; Del Monte and Papagni, 2001; Méndez and Sepùlveda, 2006), reduces the legitimacy of government in the eyes of the governed, can affect political stability (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003), and is a key element i”