Does Credit Crunch Investment Down? New Evidence on the Real Effects of the Bank-Lending Channel

By F. Cingano, Francesco Manaresi, Enrico Sette. 2016

304 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/dd8d1c992132511c228ff3842a30a7b79da255b8

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Finance

Citations in the corpus

Disentangling the Effects of a Banking Crisis: Evidence from German Firms and Counties (2018, background): “…of developed economies 2 Gan (2007); Khwaja and Mian (2008); Amiti and Weinstein (2011); Schnabl (2012); Paravisini et al. (2015); Garicano and Steinwender (2016); Cingano, Manaresi, and Sette (2016); and Bentolila et al. (forthcoming) present further evidence. during and after the Great Recession.”
Real Effects of the Sovereign Debt Crisis in Europe: Evidence from Syndicated Loans (2018, unknown): “Second, Crosignani (2014) shows that as default risk of GIIPS countries increases, highly levered banks have an incentive to increase their domestic sovereign debt holdings.”
Productivity growth in Italy: a tale of a slow-motion change (2018, unknown): “During the financial crisis of 2007-2008, though, the aggregate impact of credit tightening has become more relevant: according to Cingano et al. (2016), the unprecedented negative credit supply shock explains around 20 per cent of the drop in aggregate investments.”
On the direct and indirect real effects of credit supply shocks (2019, background): “Papers in this strand include Khwaja and Mian (2008), Chodorow-Reich (2014), Jimenez, Mian, Peydro, and Saurina (2014), Greenstone, Mas, and Nguyen (2015), Cingano, Manaresi, and Sette (2016), and Bentolila, Jansen, and Jimenez (2018).”
Sovereign debt exposure and the bank lending channel: Impact on credit supply and the real economy (2020, methodology): “7 Firm Fixed e ect and Credit Demand As discussed in the paper, other studies employing a similar within-firm identification strategy have treated the estimated fixed e ects as nuisance parameters (Gan 2007b; Khwaja and Mian 2008; Jiménez and Ongena 2012; Jiménez et al. 2014; Cingano et al. 2016).”
The Real Effects of Relationship Lending (2017, methodology): “We address this concern in three ways: we test for the presence of sorting in bank-firm relationships; we instrument our measure of relationship lending; and we include relationshiplevel fixed effects as additional controls (as proposed by Cingano et al (2016)).”