Real Effects of the Sovereign Debt Crisis in Europe: Evidence from Syndicated Loans

By V. Acharya, Tim Eisert, Christian Eufinger, Christian W. Hirsch. 2018

413 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e4e94d434c677f78ec0bcd6a544712a046c7daaa

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Citations in the corpus

The Pass-Through of Sovereign Risk (2016, methodology): “, the evidence in Acharya et al. (2014) using data on syndicated loans originated by European banks and the evidence in Bofondi, Carpinelli, and Sette (2013) and Bottero, Lenzu, and Mezzanotti (2015) using the Italian Credit Register.”
The Anatomy of the Transmission of Macroprudential Policies (2020, neutral): “We measure the credit provided by bank b to firms in county c, industry l, of quality q in semester t; that is, we group firms into clusters based on their county, industry, and quality at time t and investigate the lending behavior of banks to a cluster of firms (Acharya et al., 2018).”
The Dynamics of Non-Performing Loans during Banking Crises (2019, positive): “Second, high public debt may induce a sovereign-bank nexus where banks increase their domestic sovereign bond purchases due to government pressure or in a gamble for resurrection, thereby crowding out new credit to the private sector (Acharya et al. 2018; Ari, 2017).”
The pricing of green bonds: Are financial institutions special? (2019, neutral): “To identify the lead bank in each loan, we follow previous literature (see, e.g. Ivashina, 2009, Acharya et al., 2018) and consider the definitions suggested by Standard & Poor’s, which for the European loan market are ‘mandated lead arranger’, ‘mandated arranger’, or ‘bookrunner’.”
The Real Effects of Relationship Lending (2017, background): “Bofondi, Carpinelli and Sette (2013) measure the impact on credit supply of the shock to the Italian sovereign debt around the European sovereign debt crisis by exploiting heterogeneity in the location of banks’ headquarters and Bottero, Lenzu and Mezzanotti (2016) extend the results to consider the”
The Invisible Hand of the Government: Moral Suasion during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis (2019, positive): “Our paper most directly relates to the recent literature on the sovereign-bank “doom loop” (Acharya et al., 2014; Farhi and Tirole, 2018; Gennaioli et al., 2014a).”
Bank Exposures and Sovereign Stress Transmission (2017, neutral): “Second, as illustrated in Table II, our bank loan data cover almost 70% of the corresponding national lending aggregates, compared with the 10% coverage of the syndicated loan data used by Popov and Van Horen (2014), De Marco (2017), and Acharya et al. (2015).”
Zombie Credit and (Dis-)Inflation: Evidence from Europe (2020, background): “Finally, based on syndicated loan data, Acharya et al. (2019) show that there are also no significant differences between zombie and low-quality non-zombie firms in other loan characteristics like loan size, maturity, or loan type. Next, we track the performance of the firms that we classify as zomb”
ESBies: Safety in the Tranches (2017, background): “Near-insolvent banks attempted to earn ‘carry’ on interest rate spreads in a gamble for resurrection (Acharya and Steffen, 2015; Acharya et al., 2016; Buch et al., 2016).”
Real time monitoring of asset markets: Bubbles and crises (2018, background): “2 Example 2: Credit Risk in the European Sovereign Sector The European sovereign debt sector experienced an extremely turbulent period over the last decade, which caused significant harm to the real economy (Acharya et al., 2018) and led to an unprecedented level of unemployment (Karafolas and Alexa”
A Tale of Two Decades: The Ecb's Monetary Policy at 20 (2019, background): “Similar to Popov and Van Horen (2014), Acharya et al. (2018), De Marco (2019), and Baldwin and Giavazzi (2015) – and the eighteen contributions included in that book – we identify the negative feedback loop between sovereigns, banks and firms as one of the key transmission channels of the sovereign ”