Distinct Emotions, Distinct Domains: Anger, Anxiety and Perceptions of Intentionality

By M. Petersen. Journal of Politics, 2010

107 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Drawing on recent work in evolutionary psychology, anxiety and anger are argued to be distinct emotions operating in the domains of hazards and morality, respectively. Based on this distinction, it is predicted and demonstrated that the effect of anger on criminal justice opinions (and another moral emotion: compassion) is conditioned by perceptions of the intentions of criminals, while the effect of anxiety is unrelated to these perceptions. These results demonstrate that it is fruitful to distinguish emotions beyond their valence.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Social Psychology, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/dd057cdd62414faf76bd91607447014c7b6173b8

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Cognitive Neuroscience

1. Dane G. Wendell
2. L. Aarøe
3. Scott Clifford

In Social Psychology

1. Dane G. Wendell
2. L. Aarøe
3. Scott Clifford

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Dane G. Wendell
2. L. Aarøe
3. Scott Clifford
4. M. Petersen

Citations in the corpus

• How Disgust Influences Health Purity Attitudes (2016, background): “2013), while sadness and anger cause higher and lower support for welfare, respectively (Petersen 2010; Petersen et al. 2012; Small and Lerner 2008).”
• Investigating Frame Strength: The Case of Episodic and Thematic Frames (2011, background): “Compare Petersen (2010) for a similar selection criterion.”