Bookbuilding and Strategic Allocation

By Francesca Cornelli, David Goldreich. 2001

463 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/dce53540af0f034c384bda39bf95007dd0725b15

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Citations in the corpus

Allocation of initial public offerings and flipping activity (2003, unknown): “This is consistent with the book-building argument of Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) in which underwriters reward investors who provide strong indications of interest by allocating larger proportions of shares in IPOs with strong premarket demand.”
Investment Banking and Securities Issuance (2003, background): “Also, investors who were willing to buy issues when demand was weak would be rewarded with favorable allocations when demand was strong (Cornelli and Goldreich (2001)).”
Media Legitimation Effects in the Market for Initial Public Offerings (2003, background): “Although high turnover shows that investors are interested in both buying and selling a stock, we view high turnover as suggestive of legitimacy as well because it usually indicates an oversubscribed offering, in which demand for shares of the IPO exceeds the supply ( Cornelli & Goldreich, 2001 ).”
Evidence Of Information Spillovers In The Production Of Investment Banking Services (2003, unknown): “For more recent and extensive evidence, see Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2001).”
Differences between European and American IPO Markets (2003, methodology): “In general, the recent academic literature (Cornelli and Goldreich, 2001) has framed the allocation decision in terms of the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) mechanism design model, whereas the earlier literature (Keloharju, 1993) framed the decision in terms of the Rock (1986) adverse selection model.”
Lending relationships in the interbank market (2003, unknown): “Our paper is also related to the papers which show that more regular customers tend to receive better allocations or prices when buying shares, both in primary markets (Cornelli and Goldreich, 2005) and secondary markets (Bernhardt et al., 2004).”
Whom You Know Matters: Venture Capital Networks and Investment Performance (2007, unknown): “Bulge-bracket investment banks, for instance, make use of strong relationships with institutional investors when pricing and distributing corporate securities (Cornelli and Goldreich (2001)).”
Do Investors Overweight Personal Experience? Evidence from IPO Subscriptions (2008, background): “Investment banks may reward regular investors by favoring them in allocations of hot IPOs (e.g., Cornelli and Goldreich, 2001; Loughran and Ritter, 2002).”
Auctioned IPOs: The U.S. Evidence (2009, unknown): “Scaled by the size of the IPO, the average institutional bid represents approximately 0.6% of total demand, which is in line with the numbers reported in Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) and Jenkinson and Jones (2004) for bookbuilt IPOs.”
Constructing Deal Networks: Brokers as Network “Architects” in the U.S. IPO Market and Other Examples (2004, background): “In highly anticipated offerings, especially during hot markets, requests for shares may be several times greater than the number of shares available (Cornelli & Goldreich, 2001 ).”
Perceptions and Price: Evidence from CEO Presentations at IPO Roadshows (2017, background): “In fact, the majority of final offerings price outside of the initially proposed range, suggesting that investors’ indications of interest are often significantly different from underwriters’ expectations (Cornelli and Goldreich, 2001, 2003; Lowry and Schwert, 2004).”
Influencing Initial Public Offering Investors with Prestige: Signaling with Board Structures (2003, background): “Investment bankers attempt to reduce this uncertainty through "bookbuilding" (for an excellent description of this process, see Cornelli & Goldreich, 2001).”
Endogenous Entry and Partial Adjustment in IPO Auctions: Are Institutional Investors Better Informed? (2010, unknown): “Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) provide evidence consistent with this, and document that there are a substantial number of regular investors in their sample of bookbuilding offerings: 19.”