The role of bank monitoring in corporate governance: Evidence from borrowers’ earnings management behavior

By Sungyoon Ahn, Wooseok Choi. 2009

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Do Banks Value the Eco-Friendliness of Firms’ in Their Corporate Lending Decision? Some Empirical Evidence (2012, background): “High firms‘ revenue helps the bank to manage their reputation risk (Ahn & Choi, 2009) which is one of the most important elements in the banks‘ risk management process (Fraser, Gup & Kolari 2001).”
Moral hazard and adverse selection in the originate-to-distribute model of bank credit (2009, background): “See Diamond (1984), Fama (1985), Pennacchi (1988), Diamond (1991), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Patel (1999), Byers, Fields, and Fraser (2008), Ahn and Choi (2009) and others for these discussions.”
Impact of proximity to debt covenant violation on earnings management (2013, unknown): “Prior research also indicates that secured loans lead to less lenders’ monitoring incentive because lenders are relieved of most of the credit risk by securing the loan (Ahn and Choi 2009; Dennis and Mullineaux 2000).”
Audit quality, debt financing, and earnings management: Evidence from Jordan (2017, background): “Ahn and Choi (2009) documented lower earnings management for financially healthy companies for bank loans.”