Moral hazard and adverse selection in the originate-to-distribute model of bank credit
By Antje Berndt, Anurag Gupta. 2009
211 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f614a5bbce1294d0eb88b4ac237ed6cfc5c9828a
Citations in the corpus
- Laying off credit risk: Loan sales versus credit default swaps (2013, unknown): “R i,j = 1−C p+θ∆ + C if i, j = p, n 1−C+b p+∆ + C if i, j = p,m 1−C p+θ∆−θβ + C if i, j = s, n; 1−C+(1−θ)b p+∆−θβ + C if i, j = s,m (5)”
- Financial Crises and the Composition of Cross-Border Lending (2014, unknown): “An important corporate finance literature on lender incentives in the process of syndication uses the same data or subsets of the data from other providers (see, e.g., Gopalan, Nanda and Yerramilli, 2011; Berndt and Gupta, 2009; Sufi, 2007).”
- Manufacturing Tail Risk: A Perspective on the Financial Crisis of 2007-09 (2010, unknown): “There was the securitization of these mortgages, which allowed credit markets to grow rapidly, but at the cost of some lenders having little “skin in the game” and in turn contributing to the deterioration in loan quality (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008; Mian and Sufi, 2008; Berndt and Gupta, 2008; Keys ”
- The Role of Bank Reputation in “Certifying” Future Performance Implications of Borrowers’ Accounting Numbers (2012, unknown): “Specific to syndicated loans, Berndt and Gupta (2009) document that the stock returns of”