What we owe each other

By T. Scanlon. 1998

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In Philosophy

Citations in the corpus

Artificial Intelligence, Values, and Alignment (2020, background): “…and contractualist moral theories require that an agent understand the concept of a ‘reason’ and subject it to certain kinds of hypothetical test before knowing how to proceed — capabilities that extend well beyond most existing forms of artiﬁcial agent (Kant and Schneewind, 2002; Scanlon, 1998).”
There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes (2018, background): “Other views explain value in terms of reasons for desires (Scanlon 1998) or some other privileged positive attitudes (Suikkanen 2009, Way 2013).”
This Thing Called Fairness (2019, background): “derthebannerofcontractualism.Scanlon,a keymoderncontractualist,explicitlyrelatesfairnesstotheconstructionofsocialcontracts,noting thatwecanconsiderfairnessintermsoftheeﬀectsithasonothersweinteractwith[132].Healso argues that human rights matter only insofar as the consequences of having those rights”
CONSEQUENTIALIZING MORAL THEORIES (2007, background): “According to that view, since any rational action must aim at some result, reasons that bear on whether to perform an action must appeal to the desirability or undesirability of having that result occur, taking into account the intrinsic value of the action itself (Scanlon 1998, 84).”
Debriefing with good judgment: combining rigorous feedback with genuine inquiry. (2007, background): “Importantly, even mistakes are usually the result of intentionally rational actions [23,27,30].”
Rationality’s Fixed Point (or: In Defense of Right Reason) (2015, background): “There’s also the issue that in his earlier writings (such as Scanlon (1998)) Scanlon claimed only structural claims have to do with rationality, but by Scanlon (2003) he ceased to rely on that assumption.”