Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility

By H. Greaves, David K Wallace. 2006

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An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy* (2010, background): “• How can the theory be translated into a more abstract system of axiomatic constraints on both belief update and the geometrical background system (along the lines of Joyce, but also Greaves & Wallace [4])? How robust are our results if, at the relevant places, summing up of inaccuracies gets repla”
Leitgeb and Pettigrew on Accuracy and Updating (2012, methodology): “…Brier score, ADEG requires a different updating procedure entirely, which I will argue has absurd consequences.9 r demonstrations, see Oddie (1997), Greaves and Wallace (2006), and Leitgeb and grew (2010b). r extensive discussion, see Jeffrey (1983). here will be different updating procedures for…”
Strictly Proper Scoring Rules (2014, background): “” Strict propriety as a desideratum for epistemic SRs has been argued for in various contexts [30, Section 3 and 5], see also [15, 18, 20, 36].”