An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy*

By Hannes Leitgeb, Richard Pettigrew. Philosophia Scientiæ, 2010

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Strictly Proper Scoring Rules (2014, background): “The terminology in the literature has not yet converged, the function L has been called an (local) “inaccuracy measure” in [30, 43], whereas Predd et al.”
An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy* (2010, background): “The derivation of this precise version was the subject of this article’s prequel (Leitgeb and Pettigrew 2010), and we presuppose the conclusion of that prequel in what follows.”
Leitgeb and Pettigrew on Accuracy and Updating (2012, methodology): “Unlike Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010b), I do take both of these facts to be problematic, although I do not think they are necessarily fatal.”
What Does It Mean to be Biased: Motivated Reasoning and Rationality (2014, background): “Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010b) demonstrate that for”
Probabilism, entropies and strictly proper scoring rules (2015, background): “565 Such an argument was put forward in [30, 31].”
Because Hitler did it! Quantitative tests of Bayesian argumentation using ad hominem (2012, methodology): “…was low (the 10Although this isn’t required on strict subjectivist Bayesianism, this follows given the assumption of a norm for accuracy (see also Leitgeb & Pettigrew, 2010a, 2010b), which is especially desirable in situations in which future actions may be based on these beliefs. positive…”