The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment
By D. Scharfstein, Jeremy C. Stein. 2000
1,749 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/db871c12a0be0f0ea5f7aecf7dc811ceb41850d5
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- René M. Stulz
- Vikram K. Nanda
- V. Acharya
- Heitor Almeida
- Luc Renneboog
- Ross Levine
- Amit Seru
- Vojislav Maksimovic
In Economics and Econometrics
- Vojislav Maksimovic
- Amit Seru
- Gordon M. Phillips
- V. Acharya
- Vikram K. Nanda
- Luc Laeven
- Thorsten Beck
- Asli Demirgüç-Kunt
In Finance
- René M. Stulz
- Luc Laeven
- V. Acharya
- Asli Demirgüç-Kunt
- G. Schepens
- Ross Levine
- Vikram K. Nanda
- Artyom Durnev
Citations in the corpus
- The Positive Effects of Biased Self-Perceptions in Firms (2007, neutral): “1 For example, the success and viability of integrated firms (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000), partnerships (Farrell and Scotchmer, 1988; Levin and Tadelis, 2005), strategic alliances (Jensen and Meckling, 1995; Holmström and Roberts, 1998), and joint The Author 2007.”
- Corporate governance and firm profitability: evidence from Korea before the economic crisis (2003, methodology): “Therefore, after establishing the result that effects of ownership concentration hold even with firm dummies included, I use industry dummies in the rest of the analysis.”
- The spillover effects of MD&A disclosures for real investment: The role of industry competition (2019, background): “On one hand, more intense competition can provide stronger implicit incentives to managers by threatening the company's survival and constraining their slack (Hart, 1983; Schmidt, 1997).”
- Capital Allocation and Delegation of Decision-Making Authority within Firms (2014, neutral): “15 Given that European and Asian executives receive less incentive pay than do U.S. executives, the increased socialism in foreign firms is consistent with the Ozbas and Scharfstein (2009), Palia (1998), and Scharfstein and Stein (2000) implications mentioned above.”
- Internal Capital Markets in Times of Crisis: The Benefit of Group Affiliation* (2019, neutral): “divisional rent seeking) of internal capital markets in large, diversified conglomerates (e.g., Lang and Stulz, 1994; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000).”
- Managerial Incentives, Capital Reallocation, and the Business Cycle (2008, background): “9Papers which study the incentive issues in capital budgeting with multiple projects or divisions and in internal capital markets include Stein (1997), Harris and Raviv (1998), Scharfstein and Stein (2000), De Motta (2003), and Bernardo, Luo, and Wang (2006).”