The Political Economy of Corporate Governance
By M. Pagano, Paolo F. Volpin. 2005
923 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/db214dc56306ee2689696e08959d7bdaf6e17170
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Narjess Boubakri
- Ruth V. Aguilera
- Elena Carletti
- Walid Saffar
- Peter K. Pham
- Heitor Almeida
- Omrane Guedhami
- Bert Scholtens
In Economics and Econometrics
- Elena Carletti
- Muhammad Shahbaz
- Nanthakumar Loganathan
- Franklin Allen
- Aviral Kumar Tiwari
- R. Rajan
- Daniel Wolfenzon
- Heitor Almeida
Citations in the corpus
- Corporate Governance and Control (2003, neutral): “A recent exception is Pagano and Volpin (1999) who derive the degree of investor protection endogenously from a political equilibrium between ‘rentier’, management and employees.”
- Social Capital, Investments and External Financing (2015, neutral): “Pagano and Volpin (2005) argue that there is no inherent reason why common law should provide shareholders with stronger protections.”
- Financial Development and Income Inequality: Is There Any Financial Kuznets Curve in Iran? (2014, background): “Similarly; Goldsmith (1969), Mckinnon (1973), King and Levine (1993), Pagano and Volpin (2001), Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004), Shan (2005), Ma and Jalil (2008) and Shahbaz (2010) paid their attention to identify the degrees as well as effectiveness of financial development on sustained economic…”
- Investor Protection and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Worldwide Ceo Turnover (2004, neutral): “6 Volpin [2002] observes that prior literature takes two empirical approaches to evaluating the effectiveness of corporate governance.”
- Accounting for financial instruments: An analysis of the determinants of disclosure in the Portuguese stock exchange☆ (2007, background): “The first group includes Tarca (2004), Cuijpers and Buijink (2005), Ashbaugh (2001), Murphy (1999), El-Gazzar, Finn, and Jacob (1999) and Dumontier and Raffournier (1998).”
- FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE, AND GROWTH (2001, background): “Other studies are much less pessimis tic, attributing differences in financial development more to the current strength of private interests opposing development than to deep structural im pediments (see Pagano and Volpin (2000); or Rajan and Zingales (2001), for example).”