Incentives for sharing in peer-to-peer networks

By Philippe Golle, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Ilya Mironov. ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2001

631 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

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Overcoming free-riding behavior in peer-to-peer systems (2005, methodology): “One of the .rst studies that considered payment schemes in P2P transactions is [Golle et al., 2001], which uses a game theoretical model to study the potential bene.ts of introducing micropayment methods into P2P .le-sharing systems.”
A game theoretic framework for incentives in P2P systems (2003, background): “Two forms of incentives have been considered in the past [5]: (1) monetary payments (one pays to consume resources and is paid to contribute resources), and (2) differential service (peers that contribute more get better quality of service).”
Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems (2004, background): “We present the e.ect of mechanisms that exclude low type users or, more realistic, penalize free-riders with degraded service.”
Designing a super-peer network (2003, background): “In regards to the ﬁrst point, systems such as MojoNation [12] and ongoing research (e.g., [3, 8]) seek to develop incentives for users to contribute.”
Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks (2004, background): “The unique challenges imposed by peer-to-peer systems inspired additional body of work [5] [37], mainly in the context of packet forwarding in wireless ad-hoc routing [8] [27] [30] [35], and file sharing [15] [31].”