A game theoretic framework for incentives in P2P systems

By Chiranjeeb Buragohain, D. Agrawal, Subhash Suri. International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing, 2003

336 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks are self-organizing, distributed systems, with no centralized authority or infrastructure. Because of the voluntary participation, the availability of resources in a P2P system can be highly variable and unpredictable. We use ideas from game theory to study the interaction of strategic and rational peers, and propose a differential service-based incentive scheme to improve the system's performance.

Subfields: Computer Networks and Communications, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3d4264de647fa506abd9fadb95dc4e41c14fb63e

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In Computer Networks and Communications

In Management Science and Operations Research

Citations in the corpus

Game Theory in Wireless and Communication Networks (2008, background): “Consequently, numerous research activities [304, 394, 385, 112, 80, 36, 426, 311, 408] have focused on studying and analyzing peerto-peer systems from various perspectives, ranging from data exchange [394], resource reciprocation [385], and cooperative download [36] to legal issues [408].”
Incentives for sharing in peer-to-peer networks (2001, background): “For details on this the reader may consult [4], [5].”
Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks (2004, background): “The unique challenges imposed by peer-to-peer systems inspired additional body of work [5] [37], mainly in the context of packet forwarding in wireless ad-hoc routing [8] [27] [30] [35], and file sharing [15] [31].”
Survey of research towards robust peer-to-peer networks: Search methods (2006, background): “Security Character [172-182] Identity Reputation and Trust Incentives Goals [25, 27, 71, 183-197] Availability Authenticity Anonymity Access Control Fair Trading”
Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems (2004, background): “, [3], [12], and [16]) support this approach.”
A survey and comparison of peer-to-peer overlay network schemes (2005, background): “Formal game theoretical approach and models [58]–[60] could be constructed to analyze equilibrium of user strategies to implement incentives for cooperation.”