Relations among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes

By Mihir Bellare, Anand Desai, David Pointcheval, Phillip Rogaway. 1998

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Citations in the corpus

Boosting and Differential Privacy (2010, background): “We do this by introducing a differentially private analogue of the “left or right” notion of security for encryption schemes, due to Bellare, Desai, Jokipii, and Rogaway [1].”
VC3: Trustworthy Data Analytics in the Cloud Using SGX (2015, methodology): “Our implementation uses an IND- CCA2 [10] RSA encryption scheme.”
On Privacy Models for RFID (2007, methodology): “We use the standard definitions of public-key cryptosystems (PKC), INDCPA and IND-CCA security [6,13,20,29,34].”
A Survey of Homomorphic Encryption for Nonspecialists (2007, background): “This notion was formalized di ﬀ erently by Dolev et al. [39, 40], and by Bellare et al. [41], both approaches being proved equivalent by Bellare and Sa-hai [42].”
Lecture Notes on Cryptography (2001, background): “See [21] for a classification of these notions and discussion of relations among them.”
Squealing Euros: Privacy Protection in RFID-Enabled Banknotes (2003, background): “, [4] for a discussion of cryptosystem security definitions.”
Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design (1999, background): “If the public-key of the AI is to be used for several auctions that it should be secure against chosen ciphertext attacks in the post-processing mode (see [10, 9, 3] for an up-to-date discussion of the issues).”
The Order of Encryption and Authentication for Protecting Communications (or: How Secure Is SSL?) (2001, background): “among other works in [13, 12, 2] and [24, 3, 17], respectively.”
Adversarial Evaluation for Models of Natural Language (2012, background): “Our C-task bears some similarity to a particular notion of security of an encryption scheme called “indistinguishability of encryptions” (Bellare et al., 1998).”
Formal Proofs for the Security of Signcryption (2002, result): “Following a commonly accepted practice, we denote by FUO-IND-CCA2 the security of signcryption against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack with respect to the FUOmodel under the indistinguishability notion.”
Authenticated Encryption: Relations among Notions and Analysis of the Generic Composition Paradigm (2000, methodology): “symmetric encryption, via implications and separations in the style of [3].”
Le chiffrement asymétrique et la sécurité prouvée (2002, methodology): “For relations R which could be of arbitrary arity we use the simplifying notation R(a, b) as a shorthand for R(a,b) when it is clear that b[1] = b and |b| = 1.”
RSA-OAEP Is Secure under the RSA Assumption (2001, methodology): “1 Introduction The OAEP conversion method [3] was introduced by Bellare and Rogaway in 1994 and was believed to provide semantic security against adaptive chosenciphertext attacks [7, 12], based on the one-wayness of a trapdoor permutation, using the (corrected) de nition of plaintext-awareness [1].”
OAEP Reconsidered (2001, background): “Certainly, all of the arguments in [BR94] and [BDPR98] involve only “black box” reductions, and so they cannot possibly be modified to yield a proof of security.”