The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development

By Chenggang Xu. 2011

2,216 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/da188b42015182c032ffc22a9692435d1d572172

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Citations in the corpus

From “Made in China” to “Innovated in China”: Necessity, Prospect, and Challenges (2017, positive): “As a result, firms acquire some de facto security of property rights, even if the formal property rights institutions are problematic (Qian and Weingast 1997; Xu 2011).”
A variety of capitalism … with Chinese characteristics? (2013, background): “As local governments rushed to develop their own enterprises, however, regional protectionism resulted in duplication, fomenting serious problems of industrial overcapacity and mounting pressure for restructuring (Bai et al., 2004; Xu, 2011).”
Public Governance, Corporate Governance, and Firm Innovation: An Examination of State-Owned Enterprises (2019, neutral): “Second, certain SOEs face greater agency risk than others because of the substantial variation in the corporate governance, including the degree of incentive alignment and monitoring (Xu, 2011).”
Do land revenue windfalls create a political resource curse? Evidence from China ☆ (2016, background): “China allegedly fulfilled these conditions at the reform outset, which, arguably, are conducive to marketization (Qian and Xu, 1993; Xu, 2011).”
Subsidies, rent seeking and performance: being young, small or private in China (2016, background): “Introduction Under deficient formal institutions, political connections are important for entrepreneurs who invest in building these connections either to protect themselves from expropriation or to gain access to resources (Zhou 2013; see also: Xu, 2011; Zhang, 2015).”
Agricultural productivity, structural change, and economic growth in post-reform China (2013, neutral): “The references herein, Chow (2007), Lin et al. (1996), Brandt and Rawski (2008), and Xu (2011), provide detailed accounts of the reforms.”
Political promotion and labor investment efficiency (2018, background): “Xu (2011) first proposes the conception of RDA, and argue that the central governments has highly centralized over personnel, whereas resources and economic decentralization.”
State and Development: The Need for a Reappraisal of the Current Literature† (2016, result): “Xu (2011) has described the system as ‘regionally decentralized authoritarianism’, in contrast with most authoritarian systems that are highly centralized.”