Infrastructure Requirements for an Economically Efficient System of Public Financial Reporting and Disclosure

By Ray Ball. 2001

847 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d94aca0738f11a009311f24b978d4d660eb38ab4

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Citations in the corpus

Capital Allocation and Timely Accounting Recognition of Economic Losses (2011, background): “7 The use of financial statement information in debt agreements is argued to create a demand for recognizing and reporting economic losses in a timely fashion (see recent empirical tests of this conjecture by Ball, Robin and Sadka (2005), Zhang (2005), Vasvari (2006) and Moerman (2006)).”
The Effect of Accounting Conservatism on Corporate Investment during the Global Financial Crisis: THE EFFECT OF ACCOUNTING CONSERVATISM (2016, positive): “Thus, they have incentives to accelerate the recognition of currently unverifiable future cash flows (Ball 2001; LaFond and Roychowdhury 2008).”
Economic policy uncertainty and stock price crash risk (2020, background): “Corporate managers have incentives, abilities and opportunities to overstate financial performance and conceal bad news due to a variety of factors, such as compensation contracts and career concerns (e.g. Ball, 2001, 2009; Graham et al., 2005; Kothari et al., 2009).”
Does Accounting Quality Change Following a Switch from U.S. GAAP to IFRS? Evidence from Germany (2012, neutral): “Ball (2001) suggests that firms in different financial reporting environments differ in terms of timely loss recognition.”
What Has the Invisible Hand Achieved (2006, methodology): “Basu (1997) uses periods of changing liability identified in Kothari et al.”
Corporate Governance and Firm-Specific Stock Price Crashes (2016, neutral): “Similarly, Ball (2001) suggests that non-financial reasons, such as empire building and maintenance of selfesteem may also provide managers with incentives to withhold bad news.”
Earnings Quality in U.K. Private Firms (2004, neutral): “This section outlines the 11 This section is based on Basu (1997), Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000), Ball, Robin and Wu (2000a) and Ball (2001) 12 Samuelson (1965), Fama (1970).”
Ownership concentration in privatized firms: The role of disclosure standards, auditor choice, and auditing infrastructure (2006, background): “In sum, the evidence in this section strongly supports Ball’s (2001) argument that instituting the proper surrounding auditing environment by liberalizing civil and criminal litigation against auditors is crucial for governments to improve the quality of financial reporting in their countries, there”
The role of accounting and auditing in corporate governance and the development of financial markets around the world (2003, background): “United States and England (Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000). The international accounting movement assumes as an article of faith that the adoption of these standards will have a positive impact on a country's financial markets. For example, Levitt ( 1998, p. 81) asserts, "high quality accounting stan”
The Effect of IFRS Adoption and Investor Protection on Earnings Quality Around the World (2012, positive): “Ball (2001) argued that IFRSs provided high quality accounting information in a public financial reporting and disclosure system characterized by (i) training of the audit profession in adequate numbers, and high professional ability, (ii) independence from managers to certify reliably the quality…”
The Informational Role of Bond Analysts (2009, background): “, Warga and Welch (1993), Hite and Warga (1997), Warga (2004), Beaver, Shakespeare, and Soliman (2006), and Ball, Bushman, and Vasvari (2007).”
Evidence on the Role of Accounting Conservatism in Monitoring Managers' Investment Decisions (2011, background): “Taken together, the evidence from our profitability tests and the special items tests is consistent with conservatism playing an important role in providing managers with ex ante incentives to avoid negative NPV projects and in ex post monitoring of managers’ investment decisions as predicted in Wat”
Differences between domestic accounting standards and IAS: measurement, determinants and implications (2005, background): “Changing one piece of the mosaic may or may not be the optimal solution if other institutions stay unchanged (Ball, 2001; Hope, 2003a; Hope et al., 2006).”
Political Incentives to Suppress Negative Information: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms (2015, background): “Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) argue and document that highly political economies have a preference for accounting systems that produce smooth, low volatility (i.”