Allocation of Decision-Making Authority
By Milton Harris, Artur Raviv. 2005
270 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d8be6c8a9bb28f3d4f8d3faec980fd2924ec0267
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Citations in the corpus
- Centralization of franchising networks: evidence from the Austrian franchise sector (2004, background): “Although theoretical and empirical studies dealing with the allocation of decision rights exist in the organizational economics and accounting literature (Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Dessein, 2000; Harris and Raviv, 2002; Christie et al., 1995; Baiman et al., 1995; Nagar, 2002), no prior research—with ”
- Capital Allocation and Delegation of Decision-Making Authority within Firms (2014, unknown): “16 In Harris and Raviv's (2005) model, both the CEO and manager”
- Knowledge, Compensation, and Firm Value: An Empirical Analysis of Firm Communication (2014, unknown): “…“scripted” and 7 being “spontaneous”) for degree of delegation and the 8 Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) investigate productivity differences across firms and find that differing management practices are a significant causal factor, consistent with our hypothesis. level of spontenaity, respectively.”
- Design and Renegotiation of Debt Covenants (2009, unknown): “noisiness that supports equilibrium trade, while Harris and Raviv (2005) study control allocation within a firm in a setting in which both the CEO and a manager have relevant information that they can convey partially via cheap talk.”
- When Does Coordination Require Centralization (2006, unknown): “Taking limits to each term on the RHS of (27) we obtain”
- Control of Corporate Decisions: Shareholders vs. Management (2010, background): “Management chooses s p a b , so shareholders’ actual ex ante expected loss from being in control is the loss due to having no information about p plus the agency cost: 2 2 2pE p a b p a b .”