Can Output Losses Following International Financial Crises Be Avoided

138 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Finance

How researchers see this paper

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Bond Restructuring and Moral Hazard: Are Collective Action Clauses Costly? (2001, unknown): “The only formal model dealing with CACs is by Dooley (2000) who provides a model with standard assumptions about sovereign borrowers namely that they cannot be forced to repay, and collateral or other monitoring arrangements are impossible.3 Dooley shows that lenders should protect their interests…”
Do Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs (2004, background): “One reason is that some observers worry that collective-action clauses would raise borrowing costs (Dooley, 2000; Cline, 2001).”
Costs of Sovereign Default (2006, background): “Dooley (2000) shows that output losses, assumed to be due to domestic residents being unable to borrow from domestic as well as foreign creditors in the aftermath of crises, may be the most important incentive for debt repayment.”
Sovereign Debt Structure For Crisis Prevention (2005, background): “Costly debt crises may look inefficient ex post but are, in this view, the only way to discourage defaults (Dooley, 2000; Dooley and Verma, 2001).”
Toward a Statutory Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Lessons from Corporate Bankruptcy Practice around the World (2003, unknown): “The high cost of debt restructuring under laissez-faire is a necessary disciplining device to induce the sovereign debtor to repay its debts (see e.g., Dooley, 2000).”