Costs of Sovereign Default

By Bianca de Paoli, Glenn Hoggarth. 2006

352 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/952b66b911b87e57bbde88ccd8a578b7655d9c80

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Citations in the corpus

The Costs of Sovereign Default: Evidence from Argentina (2017, background): “The question of the cost of sovereign default is surveyed in Borensztein and Panizza (2008).”
Banks, government Bonds, and Default: What do the data Say? (2014, background): “Borensztein and Panizza (2008) show that defaults are followed by larger GDP contractions when they occur with banking crises.”
Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Preemptive or Post-Default (2015, background): “E(bt, i) = { yt ∈ Y : V E (bt, i, yt) ≥ V D (bt, i, yt) } for i = 1, 2 (15)”
Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default (2013, background): “However, the impact on commercial credit is brief and not sufficient to explain the total drop in trade (Borensztein and Panizza 2009).”
How Costly are Debt Crises? (2011, unknown): “Similarly, Borensztein and Panizza (2010) find that defaults are associated with a decrease in growth of 1.2 percentage points per year. De Paoli et al. (2009), comparing output growth five years before and after the occurrence of a debt crisis, find that debt crises are associated with large output”
Global Waves of Debt: Causes and Consequences (2021, background): “37 Borensztein and Panizza (2009) find that the reputational and economic costs of sovereign defaults is significant but short-lived, in part because crises precede defaults and defaults tend to happen at the trough of recessions.”
Financial Crises: Explanations, Types, and Implications (2013, unknown): “Borensztein and Panizza (2009), Levy-Yeyati and Panizza (2011), and Furceri and Zdzienicka (2012) all document that debt crises are associated with substantial GDP losses.”
What Determines Debt Intolerance? The Role of Political and Monetary Institutions (2011, background): “In the real world defaults do tend to be associated with such unpleasant consequences (see Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999, and the survey by De Paoli et al., 2006).”
Austerity versus Stimulus? Understanding Fiscal Policy Change at the International Monetary Fund Since the Great Recession (2015, unknown): “The GFM does too and adds that in the context of the lower tax collection rates in a crisis-ridden environment, governments should strengthen tax institutions rather than cut taxes (Brondolo 2009).”